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Abstract—This paper provides representative evidence on beliefs about racial dis-
crimination and examines whether information causally affects support for pro-black
policies. Eliciting quantitative beliefs about the extent of hiring discrimination
against blacks, we uncover large disagreement about the extent of racial discrimina-
tion with particularly pronounced partisan differences. An information treatment
leads to a convergence in beliefs about racial discrimination but does not lead to a
similar convergence in support of pro-black policies. The results demonstrate that
while providing information can substantially reduce disagreement about the extent
of racial discrimination, it is not sufficient to reduce disagreement about pro-black
policies.
Keywords: Racial Discrimination, Beliefs, Pro-Black Policies, Policy Preferences
JEL Codes: C91, D83, J71, J15
∗Haaland: University of Bergen and CESifo; Roth: University of Warwick, briq, CESifo,
CEPR, and CAGE. We would like to thank the editor (Ray Fisman) and four anonymous
reviewers for excellent and highly constructive suggestions. We also would like to thank Roland
Bénabou, Björn Bartling, Alexander W. Capellen, Eliana La Ferrara, Paola Giuliano, Matt Lowe,
Gautam Rao, Bertil Tungodden and seminar participants in Bergen, Bonn, Cologne (EEA),
Copenhagen, Oslo, Oxford, Mannheim, and Munich for helpful comments and discussions. We
thank Hrishikesh Iyengar for excellent research assistance. Financial support from the Russell
Sage Foundation (Small Awards in Behavioral Economics), the Research Council of Norway
through its Centre of Excellence Scheme (FAIR project No 262675), and data collection by
Time-sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences (NSF Grant 0818839, Jeremy Freese and
James Druckman, Principal Investigators) is gratefully acknowledged. All six experiments in this
study were pre-registered (AEA RCT Registry trial 2273). IRB approvals were obtained from
the University of Oxford and the NHH Norwegian School of Economics. The usual disclaimer
applies.
I. Introduction
Racial discrimination is a pervasive phenomenon that affects many spheres of society
(Arrow, 1998; Bertrand and Duflo, 2017; List, 2004). In the United States, several studies
have documented high levels of racial discrimination in various domains, such as the labor
market (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004), the housing market (Edelman et al., 2017),
and the judicial system (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2014).
To deal with this large degree of racial discrimination, the US government has intro-
duced policies aiming to actively counteract the effects of racial discrimination. However,
Americans are deeply divided in their support for such policies. For instance, while 73
percent of Democrats support affirmative action programs for racial minorities, only 38
percent of Republicans support this.1 There is a strong perception in the public debate
that this political disagreement is rooted in differences in perceptions of the extent of racial
discrimination in society (Newkirk, 2017). Similarly, in a seminal article on the drivers of
opposition to pro-black policies, Bobo and Kluegel (1993) argue that it is necessary to
correct people’s biases in beliefs to gain support for pro-black policies.
In this paper, we examine the relationship between beliefs about racial discrimination
and support for pro-black policies. We address the following three main questions: First,
how large is the disagreement in beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination in hiring?
Second, does the provision of research evidence about the extent of racial discrimination
in hiring reduce the disagreement about the extent of racial discrimination? Third,
does a convergence in beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination lead to a similar
convergence in support for pro-black policies?
To study these questions, we introduce a new approach to elicit quantitative beliefs
about racial discrimination. With respondents from a high-quality, probability-based
sample of the US household population, we elicited incentivized beliefs about the results of
a correspondence study testing for racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). Respondents were told that researchers sent out
1 https://news.gallup.com/poll/184772/higher-support-gender-affirmative-
action-race.aspx (accessed September 29, 2020).
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resumes that were identical in all respects except for the perceived race of the sender to
help wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers. After informing the respondents that
resumes with white-sounding names had to be sent out ten times to get one callback on
average, we asked them how many times they thought that resumes with black-sounding
names had to be sent out to get one callback on average.
To examine whether information about racial discrimination in hiring causally affects
people’s support for policies aiming to counteract the effects of racial discrimination in
hiring, we introduced exogenous variation in people’s beliefs by informing a random subset
of the respondents about the actual results from the correspondence study by Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2004), namely that white-sounding names received 50 percent more
callbacks for interviews than black-sounding names. To measure whether people update
their beliefs about racial discrimination in response to this evidence, we elicited their
beliefs about a second correspondence study that tested for racial discrimination in the
housing market (Edelman et al., 2017). Furthermore, to measure whether the information
provision affects people’s political behavior, respondents decided whether to receive money
versus making a real donation to a pro-black civil rights organization. Finally, respondents
answered a series of questions on self-reported views on pro-black policies.
We document several novel findings on beliefs about racial discrimination and support
for pro-black policies in the United States. Our first finding is that there is substantial
disagreement about the extent of racial discrimination against blacks. As illustrated
in Figure A.1, we find particularly pronounced differences in beliefs based on people’s
self-identified party affiliation: Relative to Republicans, Democrats think that blacks
have to send out 47 percent more resumes than whites to receive a callback. Second,
our respondents strongly update their beliefs in response to research evidence from a
correspondence study, substantially reducing disagreement about the extent of racial
discrimination. Third, we find a muted response of the information on people’s support
for pro-black policies, demonstrating that a strong convergence in beliefs about racial
discrimination does not necessarily lead to a convergence in policy views. Finally, using an
additional set of experiments, we examine some potential mechanisms behind our results
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and demonstrate the robustness of our findings to designs which mitigate concerns about
social desirability bias and question framing.
We have two main contributions. First, we introduce a new approach for measuring
incentivized and quantitative beliefs about racial discrimination by eliciting predictions
about the results from correspondence studies. In contrast to traditional survey questions,
which typically ask about “how much discrimination is there” on a scale from “a lot” to
“none at all,” our approach allows us to elicit quantitative and incentivized beliefs about
racial discrimination in a precisely defined environment. Our paper thus relates to the
literature on political polarization of beliefs (Alesina et al., 2020, 2018b; Allcott et al.,
2020; Grigorieff et al., 2020; Kuziemko et al., 2015). We contribute to this literature by
providing the first quantitative and incentivized data which allows for measuring political
belief polarization in the context of racial discrimination. Our approach is also related to
an emerging literature on the measurement of prior beliefs about the results of research
studies (DellaVigna and Pope, 2018a,b; DellaVigna et al., 2019).
Second, we provide the first causal evidence on how beliefs about racial discrimination
affect the demand for policies that try to counteract the effects of discrimination. Themat-
ically, our paper relates closely to work in political science on the determinants of support
for pro-black policies (Bobo and Kluegel, 1993; Harrison et al., 2006; Kluegel and Smith,
1983; Kuklinski et al., 1997). Our primary finding is that a convergence in beliefs about
racial discrimination does not result in a convergence in support for pro-black policies. We
thereby relate to a literature studying how information provision affects people’s policy
preferences (see, e.g., Cruces et al., 2013; Karadja et al., 2017; Kuziemko et al., 2015) and
to a recent literature on how people update their beliefs from research findings (Haaland
and Roth, 2020; Hjort et al., 2020; Vivalt and Coville, 2020).2 In a closely related study,
Haaland and Roth (2020) study how the provision of research evidence about the labor
market impact of immigration affects beliefs and attitudes towards immigration. They
find that a convergence in beliefs about the labor market impact of immigration leads to
2 See also Haaland et al. (2020) for a recent literature review of information provision
experiments with additional citations.
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a similar convergence in attitudes towards immigration. Taken together with the findings
from the present study, where a convergence in beliefs does not lead to a convergence in
support for pro-black policies, the results suggest that the relationship between beliefs
and policy preferences is context specific. Finally, our findings complement previous work
examining whether the awareness of discrimination reduces biased judgments (Alesina et
al., 2018a; Pope et al., 2018).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the main
experimental design and the main sample. Section III provides descriptive data on
people’s beliefs about racial discrimination and presents treatment effects of the provision
of research evidence about the extent of racial discrimination against blacks on beliefs
and policy views. Section IV provides additional evidence on robustness and mechanisms.
Section V concludes. The Online Appendix provides additional results and the full set of
experimental instructions.
II. Experimental design: Main Experiment
In this section, we describe the sample and experimental design of the main experiment
(Experiment 1).
A. Sample
We recruited 1382 respondents through NORC’s AmeriSpeak panel in June and July
2017.3 AmeriSpeak is a probability-based panel of the US population. The panel uses
NORC’s National Frame, which is designed to provide at least 97 percent sample coverage
of the US population. The NORC National Frame is used for several landmark studies in
3 1542 respondents completed any of the outcome questions, but only 1382 of these re-
spondents gave an answer to the pre-treatment question on the number of times resumes
with black-sounding names had to be sent (NORC does not force their respondents to
answer any questions on their surveys). In the main analysis, we therefore focus on
the 1382 respondents who answered this question. There are no significant differences
between Republicans and Democrats or between blacks and whites in not responding
to this question. Our main specification includes only respondents who completed the
question on beliefs about racial discrimination.
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the US, including the General Social Survey (GSS), which is one of the most frequently-
analyzed data sets in the social sciences. Table A.2 provides summary statistics for
this sample. Observations in the treatment and control group are balanced in terms of
observables (Table A.3).
B. Design
Structure The structure of Experiment 1 is as follows (Figure A.2 provides an overview):
We first measured beliefs about racial labor market discrimination and then exposed half
of our respondents to an information treatment. Subsequently, we measured people’s
support for policies to address racial discrimination and also elicited post-treatment beliefs
about racial discrimination.
Pre-treatment beliefs about racial labor market discrimination We used a correspondence
study to measure people’s beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market. Corre-
spondence studies rely on fictitious resumes to study discrimination in the labor market
(Bertrand and Duflo, 2017). Specifically, by manipulating whether a fictitious resume is
assigned a minority name, researchers can study racial labor market discrimination by
comparing the outcomes for resumes with and without the perceived minority name. A
seminal correspondence study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) found that white-
sounding names were 50 percent more likely to receive a callback than black-sounding
names; a finding that has been closely replicated in several subsequent correspondence
studies (Bertrand and Duflo, 2017; Quillian et al., 2017). We rely on this study in our
experiment. To familiarize our respondents with the study, we presented them with the
following text:
Researchers from Harvard University and the University of Chicago conducted
an experiment to study racial discrimination in the labor market. They did so
by sending out fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago
newspapers.
The resumes were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the job
applicant. Half of the resumes had typically white-sounding names like “Carrie”
and “Todd”. The other half of the resumes had typically black-sounding names
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like “Tanisha” and “Kareem”. The idea was to make sure that the applicants
were seen as having identical qualifications, but that the employers would use
the applicants’ names to infer whether they were white or black.
We informed respondents that resumes with white-sounding names had to be sent out
on average ten times to get one callback for an interview. To measure their beliefs about
racial discrimination in the labor market, we then asked how many times they believe
resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out on average to get one callback for
an interview. Furthermore, we promised respondents a $2 bonus if their answer was the
same “as what the researchers found.”
Our belief elicitation has several advantages compared to qualitative survey questions
that have traditionally been used to study beliefs about racial discrimination. First, we
measure beliefs on a quantitative scale that is easily comparable across respondents and
has the same interpretation for everyone. By contrast, many previous studies have assessed
beliefs about racial discrimination using a question from the General Social Survey about
the extent of discrimination that blacks face in “getting good jobs,” which is measured on
a 4-point scale from “none at all” to “a lot.”4 One concern with using subjective response
scales to measure beliefs is that different people may have different opinions about what,
e.g., “some” or “only a little” discrimination means.5 Furthermore, in our setting, racial
discrimination is precisely defined, allowing us to hold our respondents’ beliefs about the
circumstances of racial discrimination constant. For qualitative survey questions, people
may hold different beliefs about what constitutes “discrimination.” These beliefs might
be correlated with demographics, which makes it difficult to draw strong conclusions on
differences in beliefs about racial discrimination across demographic groups. Our measure
avoids these confounds. Second, non-incentivized survey questions in the political domain
are potentially more prone to the misreporting of beliefs. Indeed, small incentives for
4 Details about this variable are available at the following link: https://
gssdataexplorer.norc.org/variables/1244/vshow (accessed November 30, 2018).
5 For a discussion of problems associated with subjective response scales, see Bond and
Lang (2019).
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correct answers have been shown to strongly increase the accuracy of survey responses
and to reduce gaps in reported beliefs across party lines (Bullock et al., 2015; Prior et al.,
2015). Since our question has a factual answer, we can incentivize correct responses.
Introducing exogenous variation in beliefs Two central identification challenges when
studying the impact of beliefs on policy preferences are omitted variable bias and reverse
causality. We address these identification challenges by introducing exogenous variation in
beliefs, namely by informing respondents in the treatment group about the extent of racial
discrimination found in the study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). Specifically, we
showed the following text to treated respondents:
The researchers found that resumes with black-sounding names on average had
to be sent out 15 times to get one callback for an interview.
Since resumes with white-sounding names on average only had to be sent out 10
times to get one callback for an interview, this means that employers were 50
percent more likely to give callbacks to applicants with white-sounding names
compared to applicants with black-sounding names.
By contrast, respondents in the control group did not receive any information and
proceeded directly from the belief elicitation to the outcome questions.
Measuring support for pro-black policies: Behavioral measure A common critique of
self-reported survey questions is that they might not be reflective of real political behavior
and that they are prone to experimenter demand effects. To address these concerns, we
collected a behavioral outcome measure, namely real donations to a pro-black civil rights
organization, The Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights. We told our respondents that
they have the opportunity to financially support a civil rights organization that works to
reduce discrimination against blacks in the labor market. We elicited the respondents’
marginal rate of substitution between money for themselves and money for the civil rights
organization through a multiple price list. The respondents chose between donating $5 to
the civil rights organization and money for themselves in $1-increments from $0 to $5.
One of the six choices was randomly implemented.
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Measuring support for pro-black policies: self-reported policy views In addition to the
behavioral measure, we also collected some data on people’s self-reported policy views.
Since our treatment was tailored to shift beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor
market, we focused on labor market policies. We asked questions about three commonly-
discussed policies attempting to counteract the effects of labor market discrimination.
First, we asked respondents whether they “support or oppose government and private
programs that give qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white
candidates in getting a job.” Second, we asked respondents whether they “support or
oppose government and private programs that give qualified black candidates assistance in
getting a job.” Third, we asked respondents whether they “support or oppose mandatory
name-blind recruitment for hiring in public and private jobs.” For all three questions,
respondents reported their answer on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (Strongly oppose) to
5 (Strongly support).
Measuring beliefs about racial discrimination in the housing market To measure whether
respondents updated their beliefs in response to the research evidence, we relied on a
second correspondence study that tested for racial discrimination in the housing market
(Edelman et al., 2017). We chose to focus on racial discrimination in a different domain
out of a concern that demand effects, numerical anchoring, or a taste for consistency in
survey responses could bias responses if we re-asked the question about discrimination in
the labor market shortly after the information provision. The housing market is a good
candidate for several reasons. First, racial discrimination in the housing market holds
strong economic importance. Second, the study by Edelman et al. (2017), which serves as
our benchmark for incentivizing beliefs, used the same names and general methodology
as Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). We used the following text to familiarize our
respondents with the second study:
Researchers from Harvard Business School conducted an experiment to study
racial discrimination in the rental market by sending out reservation requests from
invented accounts to hosts on Airbnb, a website for private rental accommodations.
The requests were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the person
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who sent the request. Half of the requests came from typically white-sounding
names, while the other half came from typically black-sounding names. The
idea was that the hosts would use the applicants’ name to infer whether the
reservation requests came from white or black requesters.
We then told them that the researchers found that white-sounding names were accepted
49 percent of the time. To measure their beliefs about racial discrimination in the housing
market, we then asked what percent of the time they believe that black-sounding names
were accepted. We offered a $2 bonus for answers that fall within “2 percentage points of
what the researchers found.”
We purposefully designed the second belief elicitation to avoid potential bias stemming
from numerical anchoring by (i) using a different response scale than the first belief
elicitation, and (ii) using a scale in which higher values implied less racial discrimination.
Since higher values implied more discrimination in the first belief elicitation, numerical
anchoring would make finding evidence for belief updating in the expected direction less
likely.
III. Results: Main Experiment
This section uses data from Experiment 1 with NORC to provide representative
evidence of people’s beliefs about racial discrimination and to study the effects of the
information treatment on support for pro-black policies.
A. Heterogeneity in beliefs about racial discrimination
Distribution of beliefs Figure 1 provides representative evidence of people’s beliefs about
racial discrimination in the labor and housing markets. Panel A shows the cumulative
distribution function for beliefs about how many resumes with black-sounding names had
to be sent out to get one callback on average (respondents were told that the corresponding
number for white-sounding names was ten). This quantitative belief elicitation allows us to
assess the fraction of respondents who overestimate and underestimate racial discrimination
using the results from Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) as the benchmark.6 Relative to
6 The study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) is the most natural benchmark to use
since our respondents were made familiar with the context of that specific study. As is
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this study—which found that resumes with black-sounding names needed to be sent out 15
times before receiving one callback on average—we find that 35 percent of our respondents
underestimate racial discrimination in the labor market, 10.3 percent have correct beliefs,
and the remaining 54.7 percent overestimate the extent of racial discrimination in the
labor market.
Panel B of Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution function for beliefs about the
rejection rate of reservation requests from black-sounding names on Airbnb (respondents
were told that the corresponding number for white-sounding names was 51 percent). Using
the results from Edelman et al. (2017)—who found that requests from black-sounding
names were rejected 59 percent of the time—as the benchmark, we find that 19 percent
of our respondents underestimate racial discrimination in the housing market and the
remaining 81 percent overestimate the extent of racial discrimination in the housing
market.
The data also allows for the measurement of the share of respondents who think
that there is discrimination against whites, discrimination against blacks, and no racial
discrimination at all. For the labor market, 23 percent of our respondents believe that
there is discrimination against whites, nine percent believe that there is no discrimination,
and the remaining 68 percent believe that there is discrimination against blacks. For the
housing market, 12 percent think that there is discrimination against whites, two percent
believe that there is no racial discrimination, and the remaining 86 percent think that
there is discrimination against blacks.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
true for all results obtained from a single study, this benchmark is a noisy estimate of the
truth which depends on sampling variation as well as contextual factors. While a recent
meta-analysis provides evidence of no change in racial discrimination in hiring over time
(Quillian et al., 2017), there is substantial variation in estimates of racial discrimination
when comparing individual studies. The analysis in this section on the fraction of Amer-
icans who overestimate or underestimate racial discrimination is therefore suggestive
and should not be interpreted as conclusive evidence of misperceptions.
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Correlates of beliefs Figure 2 examines whether beliefs about racial discrimination vary
systematically by people’s background characteristics. Panel A shows correlations between
background characteristics and beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market.
We find especially pronounced differences in beliefs based on people’s political affiliation:
Relative to Republicans, Democrats believe that seven additional resumes with black-
sounding names had to be sent out to get one callback on average (p<0.01).7 Relative to
those with no college education, college-educated respondents believe that four additional
resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get one callback on average
(p<0.01). Relative to respondents with below median income, above-median income
respondents believe that 1.7 additional resumes with black-sounding names had to be
sent out to get one callback on average (p<0.05). Surprisingly, we find no significant
differences between blacks and whites in their beliefs about discrimination in the labor
market (p=0.85).
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Concerning beliefs about the housing market (Panel B of Figure 2), we also find
pronounced differences based on people’s political affiliation: Relative to Republicans,
Democrats think that reservation requests from black-sounding names were 5.7 percentage
points more likely to be rejected (p<0.01). While we do not find evidence of differences
in beliefs in the housing market across people with different education levels, we find
significant racial differences: Relative to whites, blacks think that reservation requests
from black-sounding names were 6.5 percentage points more likely to be rejected (p<0.05).
The association between beliefs and policy preferences Table 1 provides evidence using
control group respondents in Experiment 1 on whether our measure of beliefs about racial
labor discrimination correlates with some of our key outcome measures. Column 1 of Panel
7 Differences in beliefs between Republicans and Democrats might be driven by differences
in information sets resulting from the coverage of different studies by right-leaning
versus left-leaning news outlets. For example, Republicans may be more likely to hear
about studies which find little evidence of racial discrimination, while Democrats may
be more likely to hear about studies which find strong evidence on racial discrimination.
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A shows a regression of people’s actual donations to the pro-black civil rights organization
on their beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market. A one standard deviation
increase in beliefs is associated with 0.22 of a standard deviation higher donations to
the pro-black civil rights organization (p<0.01). This corresponds to 36 percent of the
Democrat–Republican difference in donations to the pro-black civil rights organization.
Including controls in the regression reduces the estimated association to 0.17 of a standard
deviation (p<0.01, Column 1 of Panel B). Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 show significant
associations between beliefs about racial discrimination and support for preference in
hiring and job assistance for blacks, respectively. Column 4 shows that a one standard
deviation change in beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market is associated
with a 0.22 of a standard deviation change in beliefs about discrimination in the housing
market. Furthermore, column 5 shows that our belief measure is also predictive of whether
people think that racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market is a “serious
problem.”
Our first main result based on the findings in this section can be summarized as follows:
Result 1. There is a large disagreement about the extent of racial discrimination with
particularly pronounced partisan differences. Beliefs about the extent of racial discrimi-
nation are strongly associated with donations to a pro-black civil rights organization and
self-reported support for pro-black policies.
[Insert Table 1 here]
B. Treatment effects on beliefs and policy views
Empirical strategy We pre-specified the analysis in a document uploaded to the AEA
RCT Registry prior to starting the data collection. The empirical strategy outlined in
this section follows the pre-analysis plans, which may be accessed with the following link:
https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2273.
Since we expect different treatment effects based on whether the respondents initially
overestimate or underestimate racial discrimination, our main specification is the following
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equation, which we estimate using OLS:
yi = α0 + α1Treatmenti + α2Treatmenti×overestimatei + α3overestimatei + α4xi + εi
where yi is the outcome of interest; Treatmenti is an indicator for whether respondent i
received the research evidence; overestimatei is an indicator for initially overestimating
discrimination (i.e., for having pre-treatment beliefs that resumes with black-sounding
names had to be sent out more than 15 times to get one callback on average)8; xi is a
vector of pre-specified controls (gender dummy; age in years; two ethnicity indicators
(non-Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks); three region dummies; household size;
log household income; an indicator for being employed; two party affiliation indicators
(Republicans and Democrats); and an indicator for having a college degree); and εi is an
individual-specific error term. We use robust standard errors for inference. Throughout
the section, we refer to respondents who initially underestimate and overestimate racial
discrimination in the labor market as “underestimators” and “overestimators,” respectively.
Do people update their beliefs about racial discrimination? We first examine whether
people use the information about racial discrimination in the labor market to update their
beliefs about racial discrimination in the housing market.9 Figure 3 demonstrates that while
there is a large and significant association between beliefs about discrimination in the labor
market and in the housing market among control group respondents, there is no significant
correlation among treated respondents. Figure 4 shows a similar convergence in beliefs
about housing market discrimination when we compare overestimators and underestimators.
More specifically, as shown in column 1 of Table 2, treated underestimators increase their
8 Since those with accurate pre-treatment beliefs (i.e., 15) should become more confident in
their beliefs, and thus should increase support for pro-black policies, we decided to group
them in the same category as those who strictly underestimated racial discrimination.
9 While respondents were asked about the acceptance rate of black-sounding names
(i.e., what percent of the time they thought reservation requests from black-sounding
names were accepted), we recoded the responses such that higher numbers imply more
discrimination.
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estimate of the rejection rate of black-sounding names by 4.2 percentage points (or 21
percent of a standard deviation; p<0.01) while treated overestimators decrease their
estimate of the rejection rate of black-sounding names by 5.8 percentage points (or 29
percent of a standard deviation; p<0.01).
To assess the degree of learning from the information, we also examine heterogeneous
treatment effects on posterior beliefs about discrimination in the housing market, posteriori,
by an individual’s perception gapi, defined as the difference in people’s prior beliefs and
the signal they receive, i.e. priori−15. Specifically, we estimate the following equation:
posteriori = β0 +β1Treatmenti +β2Treatmenti×perception gapi +β3perception gapi +β 4xi +εi
As shown in column 2 of Table 2, treated respondents increase their estimate of the
rejection rate among blacks by 0.37 percentage points in response to learning that blacks
had to send out one more CV than previously thought (p<0.01).10 There is no significant
treatment heterogeneity in the extent of belief updating between Republicans and non-
Republicans, but looking at point estimates, we find suggestive evidence of higher updating
among Republicans than among non-Republicans for a given perception gap (Columns 1
and 2 of Table A.8).11 Furthermore, using the results from Edelman et al. (2017) as the
10 We find no significant differences in learning rates among overestimators and underesti-
mators.
11 As described in the pre-analysis plan, we made an ex ante decision to focus on hetero-
geneity between Republicans and non-Republicans. We did this for two main reasons.
First, political affiliation is a stronger predictor of support for pro-black policies than
all other demographics, including race (http://pewrsr.ch/2wAjUGP; accessed Febru-
ary 4, 2019). Second, the Republican/non-Republican split allows us to include all
respondents in the heterogeneity analysis, maximizing statistical power. Third, there
are theoretical reasons for why political affiliation may be an important moderator of
treatment effects. On the one hand, the literature on motivated reasoning shows that
people who receive information that goes against their political convictions might be
less willing to update their beliefs than people for whom the information is in line with
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benchmark, we find that treated respondents on average hold less biased beliefs about
housing market discrimination compared to control group respondents (columns 1 to 3
of Table A.9). Given all of the findings discussed above, our second main result can be
summarized as follows:
Result 2. Americans strongly update their beliefs about racial discrimination in response
to research evidence from correspondence studies. Provision of the research evidence leads
to a convergence in beliefs about housing market discrimination between those who initially
overestimate and underestimate racial discrimination in the labor market.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
[Insert Table 2 here]
Does the information affect support for pro-black policies? Table 3 presents regressions
results for our main outcomes of interest. All outcomes are z-scored using the mean and
standard deviation in the control group. Column 2 shows treatment effects on donations
to the pro-black civil rights organization. While treated underestimators increase their
donations by 0.16 of a standard deviation (p<0.05), the treatment effect on overestimators
is close to zero and not statistically significant (p=0.79). Furthermore, columns 3-6
show insignificant treatment effects close to zero on self-reported policy views for both
overestimators and underestimators. Overall, we thus observe a muted impact of treatment
on support for pro-black policies even though the treatment led to a strong convergence
in beliefs between overestimators and underestimators (as shown in Figure 4).12
We next examine political heterogeneity in treatment effects. While we do not detect
their political orientation (Taber and Lodge, 2006). On the other hand, there could
be a ceiling effect given that Democrats in the United States are more supportive of
pro-black policies to being with, leaving less room to change their policy preferences.
12 There are some important differences between the donation measure and self-reported
measures. First, the donation measure involves a real trade-off between money for the
respondent versus money for civil rights organization, making it a more externally valid
outcome measure than the self-reports. Second, the donation behavior depends on
people’s beliefs about the efficiency of organization in addressing racial discrimination,
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any significant political heterogeneity in donation behavior, the patterns in the data
are generally consistent with stronger treatment effects for non-Republicans and weaker
treatment effects for Republicans (as shown in columns 3 to 6 of Table A.11). The
muted response among Republican underestimators is especially striking considering that
this group most strongly updated their beliefs in response to the information (column
1 of Table A.8), but heterogeneous treatment effects along party lines are not precisely
estimated due to small cell sizes.13 On self-reported policy views, we generally see muted
effects close to zero for all subgroups and outcomes (columns 1 to 4 of Table A.14). It is
thus not the case that the overall muted impact of the information on policy preferences
masks important political heterogeneity going in opposite directions.14 Our third main
result can thus be summarized as follows:
Result 3. Support for pro-black policies is largely unresponsive to information about the
extent of discrimination against blacks in the labor market.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
[Insert Table 3 here]
IV. Robustness Experiments and Potential Mechanisms
Experiment 1 demonstrated that a strong convergence in beliefs about racial dis-
crimination did not lead to a similar convergence in support of pro-black policies. In
this section, we present additional evidence to address potential concerns about social
making heterogeneous treatment effects more challenging to interpret than for the
self-reports.
13 One potential explanation for the heterogeneity could be differences in beliefs about
the efficacy of the civil rights organization in addressing racial discrimination.
14 One explanation for the lack of response to the information among both Republican
and non-Republican overestimators could be that they think that discrimination is
still sufficiently prevalent to justify support for pro-black policies even though they
were informed that discrimination is less prevalent than they thought. An additional
potential explanation for the muted response among overestimators is that they already
held qualitatively correct beliefs that there is discrimination against blacks.
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desirability bias (Experiment 2) and robustness to framing and incentives (Experiment
3). We also examine beliefs about the sources of discrimination as an explanation for the
muted treatment effects (Experiment 4) and whether support for pro-black policies is
elastic to other types of information (Experiments 5 and 6). All additional experiments
were pre-specified in the same AEA RCT Registry trial as the main experiment.
A. Experiment 2: Addressing social desirability bias
Motivation A potential concern with collecting the main outcome measures immediately
after administrating the treatment, as in Experiment 1, is that social desirability bias
might differ between the treatment and control group (de Quidt et al., 2018). For instance,
respondents may think that it is socially undesirable to express low support in pro-black
policies immediately after they have been informed that whites receive 50 percent more
callbacks than blacks. To address this concern, we conducted a separate experiment in
which we only asked the main outcome questions in an obfuscated follow-up study one
week after administering the treatment (Figure A.2 provides a summary of the structure).
Sample In Experiment 2, in collaboration with Research Now, one of the leading market-
ing research companies in the US, we recruited 2075 respondents for the first wave of the
experiment in June 2017. The first wave was the second component of a follow-up study
from another experiment that we also conducted with Research Now.15 Out of these 2075
respondents, 1720 also completed the second wave. As shown in Table A.2, the sample
is broadly representative of the US population in terms of several important observable
characteristics, such as race, household income, region of residence, and political affiliation.
There is balance across treatment arms (Tables A.4 and A.5) and treatment status is not
correlated with completing the follow-up (Table A.6).
Design The experiment had two waves. In the first wave, we elicited beliefs about racial
discrimination in the same way as in Experiment 1. We then administered the same
information treatment as in Experiment 1 to respondents in the treatment group. We
intentionally did not ask any of the main outcome questions in the first wave to minimize
15 In the first wave, respondents also answered demographic questions, questions about their
views on the role of the government, and questions about their views on immigration.
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the risk that respondents would realize the connection between the two waves.
Approximately one week after the first wave, respondents were invited to participate
in the second wave. We took several steps to obfuscate the purpose of the second wave.
First, respondents received a generic invitation from the survey provider to participate
in a five-minute survey which did not reveal that the two waves were connected (Figure
A.12 provides a screenshot of the invitation from wave 1).16 Second, we used different
Qualtrics accounts with different layouts for the two studies. Third, we asked respondents
several obfuscation questions about their views on investment and religion before asking
our main outcome questions.
Following the obfuscation questions, we asked the same questions on self-reported
support for pro-black policies as in Experiment 1. We also asked some additional questions
on potential mechanisms that were not included in Experiment 1, such as beliefs about the
effectiveness of affirmative action policies. At the end of the survey, we elicited posterior
beliefs about labor market discrimination using the same instructions and incentives as in
the first wave. As we use the same belief elicitation across the two waves, it is natural to
assume that respondents realized that the two waves are connected at this point.
Results: Posterior beliefs about labor market discrimination The treatment strongly weak-
ens the correlation between prior and posterior beliefs about labor market discrimination
(as shown in Figure A.6) and there is a convergence in beliefs between overestimators and
underestimators (column 3 of Table 2). There is also a positive and significant interaction
effect between the perception gap and the treatment: In response to learning that blacks
had to send out one more resume than previously thought, treated respondents on average
update their belief about the number of resumes that blacks needed to send out by 0.58
(p<0.01; column 4 of Table 2). Consistent with the findings from the main experiment,
there is no significant treatment heterogeneity based on political affiliation (columns 3
and 4 of Table A.8). Furthermore, treatment effects on posterior beliefs are stronger for
respondents with less confidence in their pre-treatment beliefs (as shown in Table A.10),
16 The actual number of days between wave 1 and wave 2 varied between one and 19 days
for all respondents, with an average of eight days.
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consistent with genuine belief updating. Finally, using the results from Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2004) as the benchmark, we find that treated respondents on average hold
less biased beliefs about racial labor market discrimination compared to control group
respondents (columns 4 to 6 of Table A.9).
Results: Self-reported support for pro-black policies As shown in columns 4 to 6 of
Table A.14, there is an overall muted response to the information treatment on support
for pro-black policies. If anything, there is a decrease in support for pro-black policies
among underestimators. This “backfire” effect is almost entirely driven by Republican
underestimators who reduce their support for pro-black policies by up to 30 percent of
a standard deviation. While the effect is driven by a relatively small subsample and
should therefore be interpreted with caution, a potential explanation for the backfire effect
could be that the treatment simultaneously changes people’s beliefs about how effective
affirmative action programs have been in helping blacks.17 As shown in column 1 of Table
A.17, treated Republican underestimators are indeed more likely to think that affirmative
action programs have hurt blacks (p<0.01). Taken together, the evidence from Experiment
2 is consistent with the main finding from Experiment 1: while the information provision
leads to a convergence in beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination, it does not lead
to a convergence in support for pro-black policies.
B. Experiment 3: Robustness to framing and incentives
Motivation While our approach of eliciting quantitative and incentivized beliefs about
the results of correspondence studies has many advantages compared to traditional survey
questions, there are also some disadvantages. One potential concern is that respondents
might believe that researchers are liberally biased. Incentives for accuracy then encourage
17 Another reason to interpret the backfire effect with caution is that we did not see
any evidence of backfire effects in the main experiment. However, it could be the
case that the backfire effect only arises in the obfuscated follow-up because Republican
underestimators did not feel it was socially acceptable to express very low support for pro-
black policies immediately after being informed by the experimenter that discrimination
is more prevalent than their initial estimates.
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respondents to report a combination of their true beliefs about discrimination and their
beliefs about researcher bias. A second concern is that the results from the belief
elicitation might depend on the question framing (Eriksson and Simpson, 2012). Finally, a
concern with measuring belief updating about research results is that the treatment might
differentially affect beliefs about whether researchers are liberally biased. To address these
three concerns, we ran a third experiment with the following key design changes compared
to the main experiment: (i) non-incentivized belief elicitations, (ii) three different ways of
framing the pre-treatment belief elicitation, and (iii) a post-treatment belief elicitation
that is not related to research results (and thus unrelated to beliefs about researcher bias).
Sample The experiment was conducted in June 2019 in collaboration with Lucid, a
provider of representative online panels that is widely used in economic research (Bursztyn
et al., 2020). We recruited a sample of 2143 respondents broadly representative of the US
population in terms of some important observable characteristics (age, income, region,
and gender). Table A.2 provides summary statistics and Table A.7 shows that there is
balance across treatment arms.
Design We randomized respondents into three different conditions with different ways of
framing the pre-treatment belief elicitation about the results from the study by Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2004). In contrast to the main experiment, we elicited these beliefs
without any accuracy incentives. In the first condition, we used the same frame as in
the main experiment; i.e., we elicit beliefs about the number of times a resume with a
black-sounding name had to be sent out to get one callback on average after informing
respondents about the true number for resumes with white-sounding names. In the second
condition, we elicit beliefs about the number of times a resumes with white-sounding
names had to be sent out to get one callback on average after informing respondents
about the true number for resumes with black-sounding names. In the third condition,
we first asked respondents whether resumes with white-sounding names or resumes with
black-sounding names were more likely to receive callbacks for interviews. In a second
step, we asked respondents to estimate how many percent more callbacks resumes with
white-sounding or black-sounding names received (depending on their answer to the first
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question).
After eliciting beliefs, we randomly assigned half of the respondents to an information
treatment in which treated respondents were told that white-sounding names received 50
percent more callbacks for interviews than black-sounding names. We then measured self-
reported support for pro-black policies using the same questions as in the main experiment.
Finally, we measured non-incentivized post-treatment beliefs about the percent chance
that there is racial discrimination in hiring without relating this belief elicitation to results
from research studies.
Results: Robustness of prior beliefs to question framing We find broadly similar patterns
based on the different ways of framing the belief elicitation. Across conditions, the largest
fraction of our respondents report that there is racial discrimination against blacks, but the
exact level differs somewhat between conditions (as shown in Figure A.4). Reassuringly,
as shown in Panel A of Figure A.7, the correlates of beliefs about racial discrimination are
very stable across the conditions. In particular, differences in beliefs between Republicans
and non-Republicans are substantial and highly robust across the different conditions.
Results: Belief updating about racial discrimination in hiring We still see evidence of
significant belief updating when beliefs are elicited without accuracy incentives in a general
setting without reference to any academic studies. Specifically, treated underestimators
increase their perception of the likelihood that there is hiring discrimination against blacks
by 5.6 percentage points (column 5 of Table 2; p<0.01). By contrast, we find no evidence
that overestimators change their beliefs in response to the treatment.18 Examining political
heterogeneity in treatment responses, we find that the effect on underestimators is mostly
18 While the belief elicitation in the main experiment measured quantitative beliefs
about the extent of racial discrimination, the belief elicitation in this experiment only
measures beliefs about whether there is discrimination against blacks. Given that
all overestimators already held a qualitatively correct belief (namely that there is
discrimination against blacks), it is theoretically ambiguous whether they should adjust
their beliefs about whether there is discrimination against blacks in response to the
information.
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driven by Republican respondents (column 5 of Table A.8), which likely reflects that these
respondents had more scope to change their beliefs about whether there was discrimination
against blacks.
Results: Self-reported support for pro-black policies We find fairly comparable treatment
effects across the different ways of framing the belief elicitation, but the effects are not
very precisely estimated due to the large number of cells (Table A.16). Overall, as shown
in columns 9-12 of Table A.14, the results are consistent with our main finding from
Experiment 1 that self-reported policy views are largely unresponsive to information
about racial discrimination. Furthermore, pooling results from Experiments 1, 2 and
3 (N=5,220), we observe precisely estimated null effects on self-reported policy views
for both overestimators and underestimators (Table A.12). Taken together, the three
information provision experiments clearly demonstrate that although providing information
can substantially reduce disagreement about the extent of racial discrimination, it is not
sufficient to reduce disagreement about pro-black policies
C. Experiment 4: Beliefs about the sources of discrimination
Motivation How beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination affect support for
pro-black policies may critically depend on beliefs about the underlying sources of the
discrimination. For instance, if people think that employers are primarily engaging in
statistical discrimination, they might be less responsive to information about the extent
of racial discrimination than if 1,720 We collect data to examine this potential mechanism
in Experiment 4.19
Sample and design We conducted Experiment 4 in June 2019 and recruited, in collab-
oration with Lucid, a sample broadly representative of the US population in terms of
gender, age, region, education, and income (N=1060). After explaining the design of the
correspondence study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) and the findings from the
study, we asked our respondents what they think is the main reason for why employers are
more likely to call back applicants with white-sounding names. We designed the possible
19 In Section E of the Online Appendix, we provide evidence that most people think that
the callback differential hurts blacks in the labor market.
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responses to match the most commonly cited theoretical reasons for differences in callback
rates as closely as possible.20
Results As shown in Figure A.10, the most common belief among our respondents is that
the callback differential is due to implicit discrimination: 39 percent of our respondents
think employers subconsciously rely on negative stereotypes about blacks. 17 percent think
the main reason is inaccurate statistical discrimination (employers incorrectly believing
that blacks are less productive on average), while 15 percent think the main reason is some
form of accurate statistical discrimination (higher variance of unobserved skills or lower
productivity on average). Only five percent of our respondents think the main reason
is taste-based discrimination (i.e. that employers dislike interactions with blacks). The
remaining 25 percent of our respondents do not think it is generally true that whites are
more likely to get callbacks than blacks.
Conditional on believing that correspondence studies present evidence of discrimination,
Republicans and Democrats alike tend to believe that discrimination is due to implicit
discrimination or inaccurate statistical discrimination rather than taste-based or accurate
statistical discrimination. However, 38 percent of Republicans say they do not think it
is generally true that employers are more likely to call back white applicants compared
to only 13 percent of Democrats. While we generally find that Republicans strongly
update their beliefs in response to the research evidence, this result suggests that there
is substantial heterogeneity among Republicans in how much they trust the research
20 Specifically, we examine whether people think that lower callback rates are due to taste-
based discrimination (Becker, 1957), accurate statistical discrimination due to lower
average productivity of blacks (Arrow, 1973; Phelps, 1972), statistical discrimination
due to blacks having a higher variance of unobserved skills (Aigner and Cain, 1977),
inaccurate discrimination due to biases in beliefs (Bohren et al., 2019), or implicit




D. Experiments 5 and 6: Are policy views elastic to other types of information?
Our main finding is that although providing information about results from cor-
respondence studies can substantially reduce disagreement about the extent of racial
discrimination, it is not sufficient to reduce disagreement about pro-black policies. This
finding raises the question of whether support for pro-black policies is elastic to other
types of information. In two additional experiments, we therefore explored whether other
pieces of information affect support for pro-black policies.23
21 We also asked whether respondents thought that sending out fictitious resumes to assess
whether white-sounding names or black-sounding names receive more callbacks for
interviews is a reliable method to detect racial discrimination in hiring. Although the
majority of the respondents agree with this statement, there is substantial disagreement
among Republicans in particular (Figure A.10). Consistent with fewer Republicans
thinking correspondence studies are a good method to detect discrimination, incentivized
evidence from Experiment 2 shows that Republicans display lower willingness to pay for
the research evidence than non-Republicans (Table A.18). Furthermore, in Experiment
3, 51 percent of treated Republicans think it is more likely that blacks are discriminated
against in the labor market, compared to 40 percent of Republicans in the control group.
Even though a substantial fraction of treated Republicans thus remained unconvinced
that blacks are discriminated against in the labor market, we still find evidence of strong
updating among Republicans on average, consistent with substantial heterogeneity in
the updating.
22 Differences in support for affirmative action across our different panels are unlikely to
explain why we see evidence of belief updating in Experiments 1–3, including among
Republicans, yet relatively high distrust in the research evidence among Republicans in
Experiment 4. While we see some variation in support for affirmative action policies
across our different data collections, as displayed in Figure A.11, we find that the
Republicans from Experiment 4 display similar support for affirmative action as the
Republicans in the main experiment.
23 Appendix D describes the two experiments in more details.
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Experiment 5 was motivated by strong correlational evidence suggesting an important
role of beliefs about differences in work ethic between blacks and whites for explaining
views on pro-black policies. In this experiment, conducted with 2999 participants recruited
from Amazon Mechanical Turk, we provided our respondents with information challenging
the stereotype that blacks have a worse work ethic than whites (Gilens, 2009). The
experiment reveals that people who receive information about racial differences in work
ethic do not adjust their views on pro-black policies.
Experiment 6 sheds light on a different prominently discussed causal determinant
of policy views and political polarization, namely political identity (Bursztyn et al.,
2019) and the importance of party cues (Brader and Tucker, 2012). In this experiment,
conducted with 4000 participants recruited in collaboration with Research Now, we show
that providing information about how the Republican and Democratic parties differ in
their support for affirmative action does not affect Democrat–Republican differences in
self-reported policy views.
Overall, these two additional experiments corroborate our finding that self-reported
attitudes towards pro-black policies are generally hard to move with information, suggesting
that these may have an important “cultural” component that is very stable over time
(Luttmer and Singhal, 2011).
V. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we provide representative evidence on beliefs about racial discrimination
and examine the scope for information to reduce disagreement in beliefs and support for
pro-black policies. We document a large dispersion in beliefs about the extent of racial
discrimination. Providing evidence from a correspondence study substantially reduces
disagreement in beliefs but is largely ineffective in reducing disagreement over pro-black
policies.
Our paper introduces a new approach for measuring beliefs about discrimination by
eliciting priors about the results from correspondence studies. The main advantage of
this approach is that it allows for the elicitation of quantitative beliefs that are easily
comparable across respondents. Furthermore, this approach allows for the provision of
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research evidence based on clean causal evidence. Our study demonstrates the feasibility
of this approach by showing that correspondence studies can be easily explained to and
understood by a general population sample. The approach could be useful for researchers
who wish to study beliefs about discrimination against different groups, such as women.
Our findings have several implications for potential information campaigns about
racial discrimination. If the goal of the information campaign is to reduce disagreement
about policy issues, a broadly targeted information campaign about the extent of racial
discrimination is unlikely to be very effective for two reasons. First, a large fraction of
the population is unlikely to change their policy views even if their beliefs about racial
discrimination change. Second, beliefs about racial discrimination are very dispersed,
making it hard to predict the average impact of a campaign as people might update
their beliefs in different directions. For a campaign to be successful, it is therefore
important to target segments of the population that are both open to change their minds
on policy and for which beliefs are not very dispersed. However, the overall likely muted
effects of information campaigns on policy attitudes could be specific to the US context.
Informational campaigns about racial discrimination might have more scope to change
policy views in countries where people are more likely to underestimate the extent of
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 Panel B: Housing market discrimination
Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 1 (the NORC sample). Panel A shows
data on beliefs about how many times resumes with black-sounding names on average
had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview. Respondents were informed that
the corresponding number for resumes with white-sounding names was ten (as found
in the study by Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). Panel B, using only control group
respondents, shows data on beliefs about the rejection rate on reservation requests sent
from accounts with black-sounding names. Respondents were initially asked about
the percent rate of acceptances of reservation requests for black-sounding names on
Airbnb (true rate is 41 percent, as found in the study by Edelman et al., 2017). They
were told that the corresponding number for white-sounding names was 49. We have
recoded the values to implied rejection rates by subtracting each estimate from 100.
In both panels, the short-dashed lines indicate the true level for whites and the
long-dashed lines indicate the true level for blacks.
32
























-10 -5 0 5 10
N=722
 Panel B: Housing market discrimination
Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 1 (the NORC sample). The dots indicate
the mean values of the estimated multiple regression coefficients. The dependent
variable in Panel A is people’s beliefs about the number of times resumes with black-
sounding names had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview on average. The
dependent variable in Panel B is people’s beliefs about the percent of time reservation
requests from black-sounding names on Airbnb were rejected. Lines indicate 95 percent
confidence intervals.
33
























0 10 20 30 40 50
Prior about the labor market
Control Treatment Control Treatment 95 CI
Notes: This figure, which uses data from Experiment 1 (NORC), shows a scatterplot
with prior beliefs about racial discrimination in hiring on the x-axis (beliefs about
the number of resumes with black-sounding names that had to be sent out to get
one callback on average) and post-treatment beliefs about racial discrimination in the
housing market on the y-axis (beliefs about the rejection rate of black-sounding names
in the housing market) separately for the treatment and the control group. Prior
(post-treatment) beliefs have been top (bottom) coded at 50. Lines indicate fitted
values with 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 1 (the NORC sample). The dots indicate
the z-scored difference in outcome variables (beliefs, donations, self-reported policy
views) between those who initially overestimate the extent of racial discrimination in
the labor market and those who initially overestimate the extent of racial discrimination.
The estimates are obtained from multiple regressions that include pre-specified control
variables run separately for treatment and control group respondents. Lines indicate
95 percent confidence intervals.
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Table 1: The association between beliefs and preferences











Panel A: Without controls
Beliefs about discrimination 0.219*** 0.241*** 0.246*** 0.217*** 0.294***
(0.040) (0.036) (0.035) (0.039) (0.035)
Panel B: With controls
Beliefs about discrimination 0.171*** 0.167*** 0.169*** 0.213*** 0.231***
(0.041) (0.034) (0.035) (0.040) (0.031)
N 653 676 677 673 679
Note: This table show OLS regressions from control group respondents in Experiment 1
(NORC). In Panel A, we regress the outcome indicated in each column on standardized
beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market (i.e., beliefs about the number of
times resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to receive one callback on
average). In Panel B, we also include pre-specified controls in the regressions (gender,
age, race, region, income, education, employment, and political views). Donations to the
NGO refers to the number of times the respondents preferred to donate $5 to the pro-black
civil rights organization over money for themselves (responses range from 0 to 6). For the
outcomes Black preference (support for giving qualified black candidates preference over
equally qualified white candidates in getting a job) and Black assistance (support for
giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale
from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support). Disc. housing refers to beliefs about
the rejection rate of black-sounding names in the housing market (elicited on a scale from
0 to 100). Disc. ser. problem refers to the question of whether “racial discrimination
against blacks in the labor market is a serious problem” which was elicited on a scale from
1 (Not a problem at all) to 5 (A very serious problem). All outcomes are z-scored.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2: Belief updating
Housing market (NORC) Labor market (RN) Labor market (Lucid)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment (a) 4.16*** 0.53 2.08** -2.51*** 5.75*** 4.17***
(1.54) (1.05) (1.02) (0.75) (1.73) (1.22)
Overestimate × Treatment (b) -9.91*** -13.06*** -4.86**
(1.90) (1.63) (2.34)
Overestimate 7.61*** 14.00*** 14.07***
(1.53) (1.34) (1.66)
Perception gap × Treatment 0.37*** 0.58*** 0.14*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Perception gap -0.30*** -0.62*** -0.52***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Linear combination: a + b -5.75*** -10.99*** 0.88
(1.12) (1.26) (1.59)
N 1366 1366 1701 1701 2098 2098
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group mean: Dependent variable 71.1 71.1 19.3 19.3 52.1 52.1
Note: The table shows OLS regression results where the dependent variables are post-treatment beliefs about what percent of the time reservation
requests from black-sounding names were rejected on Airbnb (columns 1–2; Experiment 1 with NORC), post-treatment beliefs about the number
of resumes with black-sounding names that had to be sent out to get one callback on average (columns 3–4; wave 2 of Experiment 2 with Research
Now), and post-treatment beliefs about the percent chance that there is racial discrimination in hiring decisions against blacks (columns 5-6;
Experiment 3 with Lucid). We include pre-specified controls (including gender, age, race, region, income, education, employment, and political
views) in all specifications. For post-treatment beliefs about the labor market (columns 3 and 4), we also include confidence in prior beliefs as a
control. “Overestimate” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market
(i.e., who thought pre-treatment that resumes with black-sounding names had to send out more than 15 resumes to get one callback on average).
The variable “Perception gap” is defined as Info−Prior, i.e. 15 minus the pre-treatment estimate of the number of resumes with black-sounding
names that had to be sent out to get one callback on average.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3: Treatment effects: Main experiment











Treatment (a) 0.211*** 0.159** 0.011 -0.028 -0.015
(0.078) (0.075) (0.076) (0.070) (0.077)
Treatment × Overestimate (b) -0.502*** -0.139 0.079 -0.037 0.059
(0.096) (0.107) (0.101) (0.094) (0.099)
Overestimate 0.386*** 0.269*** 0.086 0.194*** 0.234***
(0.078) (0.075) (0.073) (0.068) (0.071)
Linear combination: a + b -0.29*** 0.02 0.09 -0.07 0.04
(0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
N 1366 1327 1378 1377 1374
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table shows OLS regression results using respondents from Experiment 1 (NORC). Hous-
ing discrimination refers to beliefs about racial discrimination in the housing market (higher
values indicate more discrimination). Donations to the NGO refers to the number of times the
respondents preferred to donate $5 to the pro-black civil rights organization over money for
themselves (responses range from 0 to 6). For the outcomes Name-blind screening (support for
mandatory name-blind recruitment), Black preference (support for giving qualified black candi-
dates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job), and Black assistance
(support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on
a scale from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support). All outcomes are z-scored using the
mean and standard deviation in the control group. “Overestimate” takes the value one for respon-
dents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market.
We include the following controls in all specifications: gender, age, race (indicators for blacks
and whites), region (three indicators), income, education (indicator for having at least a two-
year college degree), employment (indicator for having full-time work), and self-reported political
affiliation (indicators for Republicans and Democrats).
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Online Appendix:
Beliefs About Racial Discrimination and
Support for Pro-Black Policies
Ingar Haaland and Christopher Roth
Summary of the Online Appendix
Section A provides all of the appendix tables. Section A.1 provides an overview of all
experiments (Table A.1), summary statistics for Experiments 1–3 (Table A.2), evidence of
covariate balance for Experiments 1 and 2 (Table A.3, Table A.4, and Table A.5), results
on attrition for the obfuscated follow-up study (Table A.6), and evidence of covariate
balance for Experiment 3 (Table A.7). Section A.2 provides additional results on belief
updating: Table A.8 shows political heterogeneity; Table A.9 shows treatment effects on
accuracy (relative to our benchmark studies); and Table A.10 shows heterogeneity by
confidence in prior beliefs. Section A.3 provides additional results on support for pro-
black policies: Table A.11 shows results on donations, including political heterogeneity;
Table A.12 shows results on self-reported support for-pro black policies when pooling
results from the three information provision experiments; Table A.13 shows political
heterogeneity using the pooled data; and Table A.14 shows results separately for each
experiment, including political heterogeneity. Section A.4 provides additional results on
robustness and mechanisms: Table A.15 and Table A.16 provide robustness results on
elicitation techniques; Table A.17 provides treatment effects on some mechanism questions;
and Table A.18 provides results on willingness to pay for the research evidence.
Section B provides all the appendix figures. Figure A.1 illustrates political differences
in beliefs and preferences. Figure A.2 provides an overview of Experiments 1–3. Fig-
ure A.3 shows differences in beliefs between Republicans and Democrats. Figure A.4
shows descriptives across elicitation techniques. Figure A.5 shows political differences
in donations. Figure A.6 shows belief updating in the labor market. Figure A.7 shows
1
correlates of prior beliefs across elicitation techniques. Figure A.8 shows correlates of
beliefs about correspondence studies. Figure A.9 shows correlates of attitudes towards
pro-black policies. Figure A.10 shows results on mechanisms, including beliefs about the
sources of discrimination. Figure A.11 shows support for affirmative action across all
experiments.
Section C provides screenshots of the consent forms for Experiment 2 and the recruit-
ment email from Research Now. Section D describes Experiments 5 and 6 in more detail.
Section E provides evidence on beliefs about the consequences of lower callback rates.
Finally, Section F provides experimental instructions for all the experiments.
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A. Appendix tables
A.1. Overview, summary statistics, balance and attrition
Table A.1: Overview of experiments
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results from the correspondence study
Control: No information
None (elicited in wave 2)
Pre-analysis Plan I
Experiment 2: Wave 2
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Lucid (N=1,060) No treatments Beliefs about the reasons















Treatment: Information about party




Notes: This table provides an overview of the different experiments conducted.
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Table A.2: Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3)
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Male 0.465 0.506 0.493
Age 48.2 47.9 45.1
Household income 68157 73461 76989
African American/Black 0.112 0.062 0.089
Non-Hispanic white 0.672 0.485 0.779
College (at least 2-year degree) 0.807 0.819 0.744
Full-time employee 0.627 0.599 0.414
Republican 0.230 0.260 0.345
Democrat 0.358 0.383 0.344
Northeast 0.158 0.233 0.186
West 0.221 0.237 0.204
Midwest 0.295 0.187 0.199
South 0.326 0.344 0.411
Overestimate discrimination 0.547 0.460 0.577
Observations 1382 1720 2143
Note: This table displays summary statistics for the three main experiments: Experiment
1 with NORC, Experiment 2 with Research Now (the obfuscated follow-up survey), and
Experiment 3 with Lucid.
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Table A.3: Balance: Experiment 1 (NORC)
Treatment (T) Control (C) P-value(T - C) Observations
Respondent age 49.06 47.27 0.047 1382
Male 0.45 0.48 0.156 1382
Non-Hispanic black 0.11 0.11 0.916 1382
Non-Hispanic white 0.68 0.66 0.508 1382
Northeast 0.16 0.15 0.721 1382
Midwest 0.27 0.32 0.034 1382
South 0.33 0.32 0.668 1382
West 0.24 0.20 0.127 1382
Household size 2.65 2.73 0.297 1382
Log household income 10.86 10.82 0.298 1382
At least some college 0.83 0.78 0.025 1382
Paid employee 0.53 0.52 0.851 1382
Self-employed 0.10 0.11 0.655 1382
Overestimate 0.54 0.55 0.708 1382
Prior (continuous, top-coded at 50) 20.53 19.72 0.300 1382
Republican 0.23 0.23 0.969 1382
Democrat 0.36 0.35 0.744 1382
Notes: This table displays covariate means for the treatment and control group for Exper-
iment 1 (NORC). “Prior (dummy)” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate
racial discrimination in the labor market. The p-value of a joint F-test of a regression of the
treatment indicator on all of the covariates is p=0.164.
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Table A.4: Balance: Experiment 2 (Research Now; baseline survey)
Treatment (T) Control (C) P-value(T - C) Observations
Respondent age 47.19 47.66 0.493 2073
Male 0.50 0.49 0.844 2073
Non-Hispanic black 0.06 0.05 0.335 2073
Non-Hispanic white 0.49 0.48 0.812 2073
Household size 2.42 2.50 0.228 2073
Log household income 10.92 10.94 0.691 2073
At least 2-year college degree 0.83 0.82 0.609 2073
Overestimate 0.47 0.45 0.350 2073
Confidence in prior 3.31 3.36 0.295 2073
Republican 0.25 0.26 0.643 2073
Democrat 0.38 0.37 0.799 2073
West 0.22 0.24 0.225 2073
South 0.35 0.35 0.947 2073
Northeast 0.24 0.22 0.281 2073
Midwest 0.19 0.19 0.940 2073
Notes: This table displays covariate means for the treatment and control group (wave 1 of
Experiment 2 with Research Now). “Prior (dummy)”takes the value one for respondents who
overestimate racial discrimination in the labor market. “Confidence in prior” (i.e., confidence
in the answer to the question of how many times resumes with black-sounding names had
to be sent out to get one callback on average) was elicited on a scale from 1 (Very unsure)
to 5 (Very Sure). The p-value of a joint F-test of a regression of the treatment indicator on
all of the covariates is p=0.918.
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Table A.5: Balance: Experiment 2 (Research Now; obfuscated follow-up)
Treatment (T) Control (C) P-value(T - C) Observations
Respondent age 47.53 48.33 0.284 1720
Male 0.51 0.50 0.759 1720
Non-Hispanic black 0.07 0.06 0.502 1720
Non-Hispanic white 0.49 0.48 0.695 1720
Household size 2.43 2.45 0.751 1720
Log household income 10.92 10.94 0.703 1720
At least 2-year college degree 0.82 0.82 0.944 1720
Overestimate 0.47 0.45 0.422 1720
Prior (continuous, top-coded at 50) 17.06 17.13 0.916 1720
Confidence in prior 3.31 3.37 0.221 1720
Republican 0.25 0.27 0.569 1720
Democrat 0.39 0.38 0.730 1720
West 0.23 0.25 0.286 1720
South 0.34 0.35 0.786 1720
Northeast 0.24 0.22 0.306 1720
Midwest 0.19 0.18 0.701 1720
Notes: This table displays covariate means for the treatment and control group (wave 2 of
Experiment 2 with Research Now). “Prior (dummy)”takes the value one for respondents who
overestimate racial discrimination in the labor market. “Confidence in prior” (i.e., confidence
in the answer to the question of how many times resumes with black-sounding names had
to be sent out to get one callback on average) was elicited on a scale from 1 (Very unsure)
to 5 (Very Sure). The p-value of a joint F-test of a regression of the treatment indicator on
all of the covariates is p=0.961.
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Response rate 0.806 0.806
Observations 2073 2073
Notes: The outcome variables takes value one if our respondent
completed the follow-up study (wave 2 of Experiment 2 with
Research Now). “Treatment” takes value one if the respondent
received information about the results from the correspondence
study. “Prior (dummy)” takes the value one for respondents who
overestimate racial discrimination in the labor market. “‘Confi-
dence in prior” (i.e., confidence in the answer to the question of
how many times resumes with black-sounding names had to be
sent out to get one callback on average) was elicited on a scale
from 1 (Very unsure) to 5 (Very sure). * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A.7: Balance: Experiment 3 (Lucid)
Treatment (T) Control (C) P-value(T - C) Observations
Respondent age (cont.) 44.71 45.52 0.235 2143
Male 0.48 0.51 0.235 2143
African American/Black 0.09 0.09 0.956 2143
Non-Hispanic White 0.78 0.78 0.781 2143
Log household income 10.94 10.99 0.160 2143
At least some college 0.74 0.75 0.613 2143
Overestimate discrimination 0.57 0.59 0.342 2143
Republican 0.34 0.35 0.715 2143
Democrat 0.34 0.35 0.784 2143
West 0.20 0.21 0.319 2143
South 0.41 0.41 0.973 2143
Northeast 0.19 0.18 0.721 2143
Midwest 0.20 0.19 0.537 2143
Notes: This table displays covariate means for the treatment and control group (Lucid).
“Prior (dummy)” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate racial discrimination
in the labor market. The p-value of a joint F-test of a regression of the treatment indicator
on all of the covariates is p=0.461.
9
A.2. Additional results on belief updating
Table A.8: Belief updating: Heterogeneity by political views
Housing market (NORC) Labor market (RN) Labor market (Lucid)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Non-Republicans
Treatment (a) 2.84 -0.65 1.60 -2.64*** 1.62 1.99
(1.84) (1.23) (1.21) (0.87) (2.25) (1.60)
Overestimate × Treatment (b) -9.34*** -12.96*** -1.24
(2.20) (1.90) (2.95)
Overestimate 6.73*** 14.20*** 15.12***
(1.76) (1.58) (2.12)
Perception gap × Treatment 0.33*** 0.62*** 0.10
(0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
Perception gap -0.27*** -0.66*** -0.52***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Linear combination: a + b -6.50*** -11.36*** 0.39
(1.21) (1.45) (1.91)
N 1052 1052 1255 1255 1375 1375
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group mean: Dependent variable 72.3 72.3 20.1 20.1 59.3 59.3
Panel B: Republicans
Treatment (a) 7.55*** 3.73* 3.28* -1.62 11.15*** 7.45***
(2.88) (2.06) (1.91) (1.48) (2.62) (1.89)
Overestimate × Treatment (b) -10.60** -12.65*** -8.97**
(4.22) (3.27) (3.86)
Overestimate 9.84*** 12.75*** 10.87***
(3.34) (2.61) (2.64)
Perception gap × Treatment 0.48** 0.41*** 0.09
(0.19) (0.13) (0.15)
Perception gap -0.40*** -0.43*** -0.46***
(0.12) (0.11) (0.10)
Linear combination: a + b -3.05 -9.37*** 2.18
(2.91) (2.55) (2.81)
N 314 314 446 446 723 723
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group mean: Dependent variable 67.2 67.2 17.3 17.3 38.7 38.7
Note: The table shows OLS regression results where the dependent variables are post-treatment beliefs about what
percent of the time reservation requests from black-sounding names were rejected on Airbnb (columns 1–2; Experi-
ment 1 with NORC) and post-treatment beliefs about the number of resumes with black-sounding names on average
had to be sent out to get one callback on average (columns 3–4; wave 2 of Experiment 2 with Research Now). In
even-numbered columns, we include pre-specified controls (including gender, age, race, region, income, education,
employment, and political views). “Overestimate” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent
of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market (i.e., who thought pre-treatment that resumes with black-
sounding names had to send out more than 15 resumes to get one callback on average). The variable “Perception
gap” is defined as Info−Prior, i.e. 15 minus the pre-treatment estimate of the number of resumes with black-sounding
names that had to be sent out to get one callback on average.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A.9: Treatment effects on biases in beliefs about racial discrimination
Labor market (RN) Housing market (NORC)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full sample Non-Republicans Republicans Full sample Non-Republicans Republicans
Panel A: Average effect
Treatment -6.66*** -7.45*** -4.44*** -3.93*** -4.47*** -2.12
(0.67) (0.80) (1.27) (0.63) (0.69) (1.41)
N 1701 1255 446 1366 1052 314
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group mean: Dependent variable 13.3 13.8 11.9 19.4 20.1 17.4
Panel B: Heterogeneity by prior
Treatment -2.22*** -2.76*** -0.93 -2.31** -3.21*** -0.19
(0.80) (0.95) (1.49) (1.03) (1.22) (1.91)
Overestimate × Treatment -9.64*** -9.70*** -8.87*** -2.96** -2.18 -4.55
(1.37) (1.59) (2.71) (1.28) (1.46) (2.82)
N 1701 1255 446 1366 1052 314
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table shows OLS regression results where the dependent variables are the absolute value of post-treatment biases in beliefs
about the about the number of resumes with black-sounding names that had to be sent out to get one callback on average (columns 1–3;
wave 2 of Experiment 2 with Research Now) and the absolute value of post-treatment biases in beliefs about what percent of the time
reservation requests from black-sounding names were rejected on Airbnb (columns 4–6; Experiment 1 with NORC). To calculate the bias,
we subtract the correct answer (as identified in the studies by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) and Edelman et al. (2017) for the labor
and housing market, respectively) from people’s estimates. We include pre-specified controls (including gender, age, race, region, income,
education, employment, and political views) in all specifications. “Overestimate” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate
the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Confidence × Treatment -2.88** -1.91**
(1.20) (0.88)
Overestimate × Treatment -23.29***
(6.12)
Perception gap × Treatment 0.85***
(0.26)
Overestimate × Confidence × Treatment 3.00*
(1.82)










Note: The table shows OLS regression results where the dependent variable is post-treatment
beliefs about the number of resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get one
callback on average (wave 2 of Experiment 2 with Research Now). In column 2, we include
pre-specified controls (including gender, age, race, region, income, education, employment,
and political views). “Overestimate” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate
the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market (i.e., who thought pre-
treatment that resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out more than 15 times
to get one callback on average). The variable “Perception gap” is defined as Info−Prior, i.e.
15 minus the pre-treatment estimate of the number of resumes with black-sounding names
that had to be sent out to get one callback on average. “Confidence” refers to confidence in
pre-treatment beliefs (measured instantly after the belief elicitation), which was elicited on
a scale from 1 (Very unsure) to 5 (Very sure).
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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A.3. Additional results on support for pro-black policies
Table A.11: Treatment effects on donations
Full sample Non-Republicans Republicans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment (a) 0.159** 0.118** 0.206** 0.135** 0.070 0.083
(0.075) (0.055) (0.093) (0.066) (0.123) (0.100)
Treatment × Overestimate (b) -0.139 -0.215* 0.015
(0.107) (0.125) (0.211)
Overestimate 0.269*** 0.268*** 0.307**
(0.075) (0.088) (0.142)
Perception gap × Treatment 0.009** 0.010** 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
Perception gap -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.010*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
Linear combination: a + b 0.020 -0.009 0.085
(0.075) (0.084) (0.169)
N 1327 1327 1023 1023 304 304
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table shows OLS regression results where the dependent variable is the number of
donations to the pro-black civil rights organization (the respondents were given a multiple price
list where they could choose between money for themselves and $5 to the pro-black civil rights
organization in increments of $1 from $0 to $5). The dependent variable has been z-scored using
the mean and standard deviation in the control group. We include the following pre-specified
controls in all specifications: gender, age, race (indicators for blacks and whites), region (three
indicators), household size, income, education (indicator for having at least a two-year college
degree), employment (indicator for having full-time work), and self-reported political affiliation
(indicators for Republicans and Democrats). “Overestimate” takes the value one for respondents
who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market. “Prior”
is a z-scored measure of pre-treatment beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A.12: Treatment effects on attitudes towards pro-black policies: Pooled across experiments

















Treatment (a) -0.019 0.002 -0.017 -0.003 0.003 0.010 0.007 0.013
(0.039) (0.036) (0.038) (0.034) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.024)
Treatment × Overestimate (b) 0.056 -0.017 0.033 0.006
(0.053) (0.050) (0.052) (0.046)
Overestimate 0.093** 0.086** 0.152*** 0.127***
(0.038) (0.036) (0.036) (0.033)
Perception gap × Treatment -0.002 0.004** 0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Perception gap -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Linear combination: a + b 0.037 -0.015 0.016 0.003
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.032)
N 5224 5223 5220 5217 5224 5223 5220 5217
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table shows OLS regression results pooling observations across Experiments 1, 2 and 3. For the outcomes Name-blind screen-
ing (support for mandatory name-blind recruitment), Black preference (support for giving qualified black candidates preference over
equally qualified white candidates in getting a job), and Black assistance (support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in
getting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support). These outcome are z-scored using the
mean and standard deviation in the control group. Problack (index) is the mean of Black preference and Black assistance; this index
was pre-specified. We include the following controls in all specifications: gender, age, race (indicators for blacks and whites), region
(three indicators), income, education (indicator for having at least a two-year college degree), employment (indicator for having full-
time work), and self-reported political affiliation (indicators for Republicans and Democrats). We also include experiment fixed effects.
“Overestimate” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor
market. The variable “Perception gap” is defined as Info−Prior, i.e. 15 minus the pre-treatment estimate of the number of resumes
with black-sounding names that had to be sent out to get one callback on average.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A.13: Pooled results: Political heterogeneity


















Treatment 0.040 0.023 -0.004 0.014 0.031 -0.005 -0.015 -0.007
(0.047) (0.043) (0.045) (0.040) (0.033) (0.031) (0.031) (0.028)
Treatment × Overestimate -0.016 -0.091 -0.043 -0.073
(0.062) (0.059) (0.059) (0.054)
Overestimate 0.173*** 0.149*** 0.232*** 0.204***
(0.044) (0.042) (0.041) (0.038)
Perception gap × Treatment -0.000 0.004** 0.002 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Perception gap -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 3725 3724 3722 3719 3725 3724 3722 3719
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Republicans
Treatment -0.141** -0.041 -0.038 -0.036 -0.054 0.048 0.066 0.065
(0.070) (0.065) (0.070) (0.062) (0.052) (0.048) (0.053) (0.046)
Treatment × Overestimate (b) 0.210** 0.189** 0.237** 0.220**
(0.105) (0.095) (0.106) (0.092)
Overestimate -0.099 -0.099 -0.070 -0.084
(0.074) (0.065) (0.074) (0.064)
Perception gap × Treatment -0.008** 0.001 -0.006 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Perception gap 0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
N 1499 1499 1498 1498 1499 1499 1498 1498
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table shows OLS regression results pooling observations across Experiments 1, 2 and 3. Panel A shows results for Non-Republicans,
while Panel B shows results for Republicans. For the outcomes Name-blind recruitment (support for mandatory name-blind recruitment),
Black preference (support for giving qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job), and
Black assistance (support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1 (Strongly
oppose) to 5 (Strongly support). These outcomes are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. Problack (in-
dex) is the mean of Black preference and Black assistance; this index was pre-specified. We include the following pre-specified controls in
all specifications: gender, age, race (indicators for blacks and whites), region (three indicators), household size, income, education (indica-
tor for having at least a two-year college degree), employment (indicator for having full-time work), and self-reported political affiliation
(indicators for Republicans and Democrats). “Overestimate” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial
discrimination against blacks in the labor market (i.e., who thought pre-treatment that resumes with black-sounding names had to be
sent out more than 15 times to get one callback on average). The variable “Perception gap” is defined as Info−Prior, i.e. 15 minus the
pre-treatment estimate of the number of resumes with black-sounding names that had to be sent out to get one callback on average.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A.14: Results separately for each experiment with political heterogeneity
Experiment 1 (NORC) Experiment 2 (Research Now) Experiment 3 (Lucid)



















Panel A: Main specification
Treatment (a) 0.011 -0.028 -0.015 -0.123* -0.082 -0.137** 0.067 0.112* 0.092
(0.076) (0.070) (0.077) (0.064) (0.059) (0.062) (0.064) (0.060) (0.061)
Treatment × Overestimate (b) 0.079 -0.037 0.059 0.254*** 0.074 0.140 -0.111 -0.097 -0.085
(0.101) (0.094) (0.099) (0.094) (0.088) (0.093) (0.085) (0.081) (0.081)
Overestimate 0.086 0.194*** 0.234*** -0.009 -0.077 0.089 0.200*** 0.179*** 0.162***
(0.073) (0.068) (0.071) (0.066) (0.063) (0.065) (0.060) (0.057) (0.057)
N 1378 1377 1374 1720 1720 1720 2126 2126 2126
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value: a + b = 0 0.18 0.30 0.49 0.06 0.90 0.96 0.44 0.78 0.89
Panel B: Non-Republicans
Treatment (a) 0.112 -0.063 -0.074 -0.091 -0.015 -0.053 0.129 0.125* 0.095
(0.089) (0.085) (0.091) (0.076) (0.069) (0.071) (0.080) (0.074) (0.075)
Treatment × Overestimate (b) -0.082 -0.081 0.030 0.218** -0.037 0.008 -0.173* -0.152 -0.148
(0.115) (0.109) (0.111) (0.109) (0.101) (0.104) (0.102) (0.098) (0.096)
Overestimate 0.201** 0.202** 0.265*** 0.089 -0.001 0.202*** 0.253*** 0.253*** 0.228***
(0.082) (0.079) (0.076) (0.076) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.070) (0.069)
N 1060 1059 1057 1272 1272 1272 1393 1393 1393
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value: a + b = 0 0.68 0.04 0.51 0.10 0.48 0.56 0.50 0.67 0.38
Panel C: Republicans
Treatment (a) -0.181 0.090 0.117 -0.195* -0.227* -0.308** -0.043 0.063 0.080
(0.147) (0.121) (0.148) (0.118) (0.116) (0.122) (0.109) (0.101) (0.106)
Treatment × Overestimate (b) 0.468** 0.098 0.271 0.364* 0.358** 0.481** -0.004 0.068 0.061
(0.221) (0.185) (0.231) (0.191) (0.176) (0.202) (0.157) (0.140) (0.151)
Overestimate -0.242 0.128 0.056 -0.300** -0.316** -0.289** 0.110 0.011 0.027
(0.164) (0.129) (0.178) (0.133) (0.122) (0.143) (0.107) (0.096) (0.100)
N 318 318 317 448 448 448 733 733 733
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value: a + b = 0 0.07 0.17 0.03 0.26 0.33 0.29 0.67 0.17 0.18
Note: The table shows OLS regression results for each experiment separately. Panel A shows results for all respondents, Panel B shows results for non-
Republicans only, and Panel C show results for Republicans only. For the outcomes Name-blind recruitment (support for mandatory name-blind recruit-
ment), Black preference (support for giving qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job), and Black as-
sistance (support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly
support). These outcomes are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. We include the following pre-specified controls in
all specifications: gender, age, race (indicators for blacks and whites), region (three indicators), household size, income, education (indicator for having
at least a two-year college degree), employment (indicator for having full-time work), and self-reported political affiliation (indicators for Republicans and
Democrats). “Overestimate” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market
(i.e., who thought pre-treatment that resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out more than 15 times to get one callback on average).
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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A.4. Robustness and mechanisms
Table A.15: The association between beliefs and policy views: Robustness across elicitation
techniques









Panel A: Anchor: Black
Beliefs about discrimination 0.208*** 0.190*** 0.224*** 0.389***
(0.067) (0.056) (0.041) (0.042)
N 347 347 347 342
Panel B: Anchor: White
Beliefs about discrimination 0.017 0.082** 0.001 0.157***
(0.046) (0.035) (0.045) (0.046)
N 371 371 371 365
Panel C: Percent difference
Beliefs about discrimination 0.126** 0.120** 0.040 0.427***
(0.052) (0.053) (0.058) (0.043)
N 346 346 346 342
Note: This table uses data from Experiment 3. For the outcomes Name-blind recruitment (support
for mandatory name-blind recruitment), Black preference (support for giving qualified black candi-
dates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job), and Black assistance (sup-
port for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale
from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support). Disc. against blacks is the percent chance that
there is racial hiring discrimination against blacks. These outcomes are z-scored using the mean and
standard deviation in the control group. Panel A shows results from the prior beliefs which we an-
chored beliefs with the number of resumes with black-sounding names that needed to be sent out
for one callback. Beliefs about discrimination is the z-scored estimate of number of resumes with
white-sounding names that needed to be sent out for one callback. Panel B shows results from the
prior beliefs for which we anchored beliefs with the number of resumes with white-sounding names
that needed to be sent out for one callback. Beliefs about discrimination is the z-scored estimate of
number of resumes with black-sounding names that needed to be sent out for one callback. Panel C
shows the results for prior beliefs in which we directly measured beliefs about differences in callback
rates between white-sounding names and black-sounding names.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A.16: Treatment effects by prior elicitation techniques
Anchor: Black Anchor: White Percent difference













Panel A: Main effects
Treatment 0.043 0.161** -0.013 -0.051 0.162** 0.025
(0.077) (0.077) (0.080) (0.076) (0.080) (0.081)
N 700 700 708 708 726 726
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group mean: Dep. var. 2.67 3.33 2.66 3.38 2.60 3.36
Panel B: Heterogeneity
Treatment (a) 0.125 0.211** 0.105 -0.076 0.134 0.016
(0.098) (0.101) (0.154) (0.145) (0.102) (0.105)
Overestimate × Treatment (b) -0.212 -0.131 -0.163 0.035 0.064 0.021
(0.158) (0.155) (0.179) (0.171) (0.162) (0.163)
Overestimate 0.357*** 0.436*** 0.313*** 0.195* 0.101 0.096
(0.113) (0.110) (0.114) (0.109) (0.121) (0.121)
N 700 700 708 708 726 726
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group mean: Overestimate 0.422 0.422 0.728 0.728 0.411 0.411
P-value: a + b = 0 0.482 0.493 0.528 0.645 0.117 0.769
Note: This table uses data from Experiment 3. For the outcomes Black preference (support for giving quali-
fied black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job), and Black assistance
(support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1
(Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support). These outcomes are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation
in the control group. Treatment takes the value one for respondents who received the information treatment.
Overestimate takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against
blacks in the labor market. We include pre-specified controls in all regressions (the controls are listed in Table
2). Columns 1 and 2 show results from the elicitation where beliefs were anchored with the number of resumes
with black-sounding names that needed to be sent out for one callback. Columns 3 and 4 show results from the
elicitation where beliefs were anchored with the number of resumes with white-sounding names that needed
to be sent out for one callback. Columns 5 and 6 show results for the elicitation where we directly measured
beliefs about differences in callback rates between white-sounding names and black-sounding names.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
18
Table A.17: Experiment 2: Treatment effects – mechanism questions









Panel A: Main specification
Treatment (a) 0.054 0.015 0.048 -0.022
(0.066) (0.061) (0.062) (0.063)
Overestimate × Treatment (b) -0.083 -0.121 -0.081 0.189**
(0.095) (0.087) (0.090) (0.089)
Overestimate 0.022 -0.080 0.465*** 0.105*
(0.067) (0.062) (0.064) (0.063)
N 1720 1719 1715 1715
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value: a + b = 0 0.669 0.087 0.607 0.008
Panel B: Political heterogeneity
Treatment (a) -0.076 -0.046 0.089 0.017
(0.074) (0.071) (0.076) (0.076)
Overestimate × Treatment (b) 0.080 0.003 -0.099 0.081
(0.104) (0.100) (0.104) (0.105)
Republican × Treatment (c) 0.441*** 0.205 -0.137 -0.131
(0.155) (0.139) (0.132) (0.134)
Republican × Overestimate × Treatment (d) -0.592** -0.488** 0.032 0.440**
(0.240) (0.204) (0.211) (0.194)
N 1720 1719 1715 1715
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value: a + b = 0 0.953 0.543 0.891 0.182
P-value: a + c = 0 0.007 0.184 0.664 0.302
P-value: b + d = 0 0.018 0.006 0.716 0.001
P-value: a + b + c + d = 0 0.383 0.013 0.442 0.001
Note: The table shows OLS regression results where the dependent variables are indicated in each col-
umn. Responses were elicited in the second wave of Experiment 2 (the obfuscated follow-up study).
Affirmative action hurts refers to the question of whether “affirmative action programs for the past
fifty years have helped blacks” which was elicited on a scale from 1 (Strongly helped) to 7 (Strongly
hurt). Inequality due to effort refers to the question of whether “differences in economic outcomes
between whites and blacks are primarily the result of racial discrimination against blacks” which was
elicited on a scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree). Inequality due to disc. refers to
the question of whether “differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks are primarily
the result of whites working harder than blacks” which was elicited on scale from 1 (Strongly disagree)
to 7 (Strongly agree). Disc. ser. problem refers to the question of whether “racial discrimination
against blacks in the labor market is a serious problem” which was elicited on a scale from 1 (Not
a problem at all) to 5 (A very serious problem). All responses are z-scored using the mean and the
standard deviation of the control group. Controls include gender, age, race, region, income, educa-
tion, employment, political views, and confidence in prior beliefs. Only the treatment indicator and
the treatment interaction terms are shown in the table.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Notes: This table shows OLS regressions using control group re-
spondents from Experiment 2 (Research Now). We offered control
group respondents the option to buy information about the results
from the correspondence study by Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2004). Willingness to pay to receive the information was elicited
using a multiple price list where respondents could choose be-
tween receiving the information or varying amounts for themselves
(between 10 cents and $1). “Willingness to pay” is the number
of times individuals prefer to receive information over receiving
money (on a scale from 0 to 7). Column 1 shows the raw score,
whereas column 2 shows the z-score (standardized using the mean
and standard deviation of the responses). “Prior” is beliefs about
the number of resumes with black-sounding names that had to be
sent out to get one callback on average . * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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B. Appendix figures






























 Panel B: Donations to NGO
Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 1 (the NORC sample). Panel A shows the mean
of beliefs about how many times resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent
out to get one callback for an interview, separately for Democrats and Republicans (the dashed line
indicates the correct answer, as found in the study by Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). Respondents
were informed that resumes with white-sounding names on average had to be sent out ten times
to get one callback on average. Panel B shows the mean of the number of times control group
respondents preferred to give $5 to the pro-black civil rights organization over money for themselves
in $1 increments from $0 to $5 for Democrats and Republicans separately. Error bars indicate the
standard error of the mean.
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Figure A.2: Overview of experiments
Pre-treatment questions
• Prior beliefs about racial discrimination
Self-reported outcomes
• Views on whether racial discrimination is a
serious problem
• Views on black preference in hiring
• Views on black job assistance
• Views on name-blind recruitment
Incentivized outcome measures
• Real donations to a pro-black civil rights
organization
• Beliefs about racial discrimination in the housing
market
Mechanisms




• Prior beliefs about racial discrimination
Questions to obfuscate follow-up purpose:
• Views on investments and on religion
Questions on pro-black policies:
• Views on black preference in hiring
• Views on black job assistance
• Views on name-blind recruitment
Mechanisms:
• Has affirmative action helped blacks?
• Inequality: due to discrimination?
• Inequality: due to differences in effort?
• Discrimination: a “serious problem”?
Posterior beliefs:
• Beliefs about racial discrimination
• Confidence in posterior beliefs
Willingness to pay:
• Willingness to pay for research evidence (control
group only)
Mechanisms
• Discrimination: a “serious problem”?
Control group (n=1,040) Treatment group (n=1,033)
Information: True extent 
of racial discrimination
Experiment 2: Research Now
Obfuscated follow-up study (n=1,720; 890/830 from 
treatment/control, respectively)
Control group (n=681) Treatment group (n=701)
Information: True extent of 
racial discrimination
Questions on pro-black policies:
• Views on black preference in hiring
• Views on black job assistance
• Views on name-blind recruitment
Beliefs about correspondence studies:
• Reliable method to detect racial discrimination?
Post-treatment beliefs about discrimination
• Percent chance there is discrimination in hiring
against whites, blacks, or no discrimination
Information: True extent of
racial discrimination
Control group (n=1,077) Treatment group (n=1,075)
Experiment 3: Lucid
Pre-treatment questions
• Prior beliefs about racial discrimination
• Condition 1: Anchor with white-sounding 
names (n=707)
• Condition 2: Anchor with black-sounding names
(n=714)
• Condition 3: Percentage difference in callbacks
(n=730)
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Beliefs about # of black-sounding CVs to get one callback
c.d.f. of  Democrats 
c.d.f. of  Republicans 
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Beliefs about rejection rate of black-sounding names
c.d.f. of  Democrats 
c.d.f. of  Republicans 
 Panel B: Housing market discrimination
Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 1 (the NORC sample). Panel A shows, sepa-
rately for Republicans and Democrats, data on beliefs about how many times resumes with
black-sounding names on average had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview.
Respondents were informed that the corresponding number for resumes with white-sounding
names was ten (as found in the study by Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). Panel B
shows, separately for Republicans and Democrats, using only control group respondents, be-
liefs about the rejection rate on reservation requests sent from accounts with black-sounding
names. Respondents were initially asked about the percent of acceptances of reservation re-
quests for black-sounding names on Airbnb (true rate is 41 percent, as found in the study
by Edelman et al., 2017). They were told that the corresponding number for white-sounding
names was 49. We have recoded the values to implied rejection rates by subtracting each
estimate from 100. In both panels, the dashed vertical line indicates the correct answer.
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Anchor: Black Anchor: White Percent difference
Disc. against whites No disc. Disc. against blacks Overestimate disc.
Beliefs about racial discrimination
Notes: This figure shows data from Experiment 3. “Anchor black” shows results from the
elicitation where beliefs were anchored with the number of resumes with black-sounding names
that needed to be sent out for one callback. “Anchor white” shows results from the elicitation
where beliefs were anchored with the number of resumes with white-sounding names that
needed to be sent out for one callback. “Percent difference” shows results for the elicitation
where we directly measured beliefs about differences in callback rates between white-sounding
names and black-sounding names. The black bar indicates the fraction of respondents who
thought that whites received less callbacks than blacks. The grey bar indicates the fraction
of respondents who thought that blacks received equally many callbacks as whites. The blue
bar indicates the fraction of respondents who thought that whites received more callbacks
than blacks. The green bar indicates the fraction of respondents who thought that blacks got
less callbacks compared to the findings in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004).
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Number of donations:  Republicans
Notes: The figure, which uses data from control group respondents in Experiment 1 (NORC),
shows distributions of the number of donations to the pro-black civil rights organization for
self-identified Democrats and Republicans separately (the respondents were given a multiple
price list where they could choose between money for themselves and $5 to the pro-black civil
rights organization in increments of $1 from $0 to $5). The figure only includes respondents
who completed all choices in the multiple price list.
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0 10 20 30 40 50
Prior about the labor market
Control Treatment Control Treatment 95 CI
Notes: This figure, which uses data from Experiment 2 (Research Now), shows a scatterplot
with prior beliefs about racial discrimination in hiring (x-axis) and posterior beliefs about
racial discrimination in hiring one week later (y-axis) separately for the treatment and the
control group. The prior and posterior beliefs have been top-coded at 50. Lines indicate
fitted values with 95 percent confidence intervals.
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-.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6
Standardized effect sizes
N=1051
 Panel B: Hiring in general
Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 3. Panel A shows correlates of beliefs about
callback rates in the correspondence study for the three different elicitation techniques. “An-
chor black” shows results from the elicitation where beliefs were anchored with the number
of resumes with black-sounding names that needed to be sent out for one callback. “Anchor
white” shows results from the elicitation where beliefs were anchored with the number of
resumes with white-sounding names that needed to be sent out for one callback. “Percent dif-
ference” shows results for the elicitation where we directly measured beliefs about differences
in callback rates between white-sounding names and black-sounding names. Panel B shows
correlates of more general beliefs about the percent chance that there is hiring discrimina-
tion against blacks. The dots indicate the mean values of the estimated multiple regression
coefficients. Lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Standardized effect sizes
Experiment 1 (NORC); N=777
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Standardized effect sizes
Experiment 3 (Lucid); N=2131
 Panel B: Method is reliable
Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 1 (NORC; Panel A) and Experiment 3 (Lucid;
Panel B). The outcome variable in Panel A is people’s agreement with the interpretation
that the findings from the correspondence study are clear evidence of discrimination against
blacks in the labor market. The outcome variable in Panel B is people’s agreement with
the following statement: “Sending out fictitious resumes to assess whether white-sounding
names or black-sounding names receive more callbacks for interviews is a reliable method
to detect racial discrimination in hiring.” For both questions, people respond on a 5-point
scale (Strongly agree/Agree/Neither agree nor disagree/Disagree/Strongly disagree), and the
outcomes are z-scored. The dots indicate the mean values of the estimated multiple regression
coefficients. Lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.
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-1 -.5 0 .5
N=889
 Panel B: Job assistance for blacks
Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 2 (Research Now). The dots indicate the mean
values of the estimated multiple regression coefficients. The dependent variable in Panel
A is support for giving black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates
in getting a job. The dependent variable in Panel B is support for giving qualified black
candidates assistance in getting a job. Both outcomes are z-scored. “Inequality: discrimina-
tion” and “Inequality: effort” are agreements to the statements that differences in economic
outcomes between blacks and whites are primarily the result of, respectively, “discrimination
against blacks” and “whites working harder than blacks.” Lines indicate 95 percent confidence
intervals.
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Black preference in hiring
Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 4. In Beliefs about source, respondents were
asked “What do you think is the main reason that employers are more likely to call back appli-
cants with white-sounding names?”. The possible answers were as follows: “They don’t want
to hire black candidates because they don’t like to interact with blacks” (Taste-based) “They
think the resume credentials are more informative about the skills of white job applicants
than about the skills of black job applicants” (Statistical: Variance) “They correctly think
that blacks on average tend to be less productive than whites” (Statistical: Accurate) “They
incorrectly think that blacks on average tend to be less productive than whites” (Statistical:
Inaccurate) “They subconsciously rely on negative stereotypes about blacks” (Implicit) “I
don’t think it’s generally true that employers are more likely to call back applicants with
white-sounding names” (No discrimination). For Lower callback rates hurts blacks, re-
spondents were asked: “Do you think the lower callback rate for black-sounding names hurts
blacks in the labor market?” For Good method to detect discrimination, respondents
were asked to what extent they agreed with the statement: “Sending out fictitious resumes
to assess whether white-sounding names or black-sounding names receive more callbacks for
interviews is a reliable method to detect racial discrimination in hiring.” For Black pref-
erence in hiring, respondents were asked: “Do you support or oppose government and
private programs that give qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white
candidates in getting a job?”
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Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Exp. 4 Exp. 5 Exp. 6
Non-Republican
Republican
Notes: This figure shows support for black preference in hiring separately for Republicans and
non-Republicans for each experiment. Respondents were asked whether they “support or
oppose government and private programs that give qualified black candidates preference over
equally qualified white candidates in getting a job.” and reported their answer on a 5-point
scale ranging from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support). The bars indicate the mean
value and the error bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. Table A.1 provides further
details about each experiment.
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C. Screenshots
Figure A.12: Invitation emails sent out for the experiments with Research Now
Figure A.13: Consent form in waves 1 and 2 of Experiment 2 (Research Now)
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D. Information about stereotypes and party views
This section discuses Experiments 5 and 6 that were discussed in Section 4.6 in
the main text.
D.1. Beliefs about differences in work ethic
A centuries-old negative stereotype of blacks is the belief that they are “lazy,
shiftless, and unambitious” (Gilens, 2009). One reason for why Democrats and
Republicans differ in their views on pro-black policies could be that they differ in
the extent to which they hold this negative stereotype.1
In Experiment 2, we asked respondents several questions to shed light on
mechanisms, including two questions on whether differences in economic outcomes
between whites and blacks were primarily the result of “racial discrimination against
blacks” or primarily the result of “whites working harder than blacks.” Using data
from control group respondents, we show that believing that racial inequality is due
to “whites working harder than blacks” is, by a large margin, the strongest predictor
of attitudes towards pro-black policies (as displayed in Figure A.9). Agreeing to the
statement that racial inequalities are due to “whites working harder than blacks” is
associated with a 0.87 of a standard deviation lower support for black preference
in hiring, conditional on controls for demographics and party affiliations (p<0.01).
To shed light on whether negative stereotyping of blacks causally affects attitudes
towards affirmative action policies, we ran an additional experiment in which we
challenge this stereotype with an information intervention.
Experimental design and sample We recruited approximately 3000 American
respondents from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online platform commonly
1 For a formal model of stereotypes, see Bordalo et al. (2016).
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used in economic experiments (Cavallo et al., 2016; Horton et al., 2011; Kuziemko
et al., 2015). We ran the experiment in October 2018 and submitted a pre-analysis
plan to the same AEA RCT Registry trial as the main experiments before we
started the data collection.
In the experiment, we first elicited people’s beliefs about which factors they think
blacks and whites rate as least important for them in a job. We then randomized
respondents into a treatment and control group. Respondents in the treatment
group received information that blacks and whites both rate short working hours
as the least important characteristic in a job. Respondents in the control group
did not receive any information. Subsequently, we measured people’s support for
pro-black policies using the same self-reported questions as in the main study.
Results In line with negative stereotyping of blacks (Gilens, 2009), the respondents
think that whites are 20 percent more likely than blacks to place least weight on
short working hours in a job (Table A.19). Furthermore, only 25 percent have
correct beliefs that blacks actually placed the lowest weight on short working hours.
But while having incorrect beliefs predicts greater opposition to pro-black policies,
the information treatment does not affect support for pro-black policies. The infor-
mation treatment also does not shift beliefs about whether differences in economic
outcomes between blacks and whites are “primarily the result of whites working
harder than blacks,” suggesting that the treatment is ineffective in challenging the
stereotype of “lazy blacks.” Given our large sample size, we take this as suggestive
evidence that beliefs governing racial stereotypes are much less responsive to new
information than beliefs about racial discrimination. Furthermore, this result
emphasizes that views on pro-black policies are generally very unresponsive to new
information.
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Table A.19: Experiment 5: Treatment effects of information about racial stereotypes









Panel A: Main specification
Treatment -0.001 0.012 0.006 0.040
(0.032) (0.033) (0.028) (0.032)
Panel B: Heterogeneity
Treatment (a) 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Prior × Treatment (b) -0.09 -0.06 -0.07 0.01
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Prior 0.18*** 0.11** 0.15*** -0.13***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
N 2999 2999 2999 2999
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value: a + b = 0 0.29 0.61 0.37 0.43
Note: The table shows OLS regression results from Experiment 5 (MTurk). The dependent
variables are indicated in each column. For the outcomes Black preference (support for giv-
ing qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting
a job) and Black assistance (support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in get-
ting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1: “Strongly oppose” to 5: “Strongly sup-
port.” These outcomes are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control
group. Problack (index) is the mean of Black preference and Black assistance; this index
was pre-specified. For the outcome “Inequality: effort” (agreement to the statement that dif-
ferences in economic outcomes between blacks and whites are due to whites working harder
than blacks), answers were given on a scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree)
and then z-scored. Prior is indicator taking the value one for respondents who thought that
blacks were most likely to rank “Working hours are short, lots of free time” as the least im-
portant characteristic in a job. Controls were pre-specified and include the prior, two racial
indicators (black and white), a gender indicator, a college indicator, age, log income, and
two indicators for political status (Democrats and Republicans).
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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D.2. Information about party views on affirmative action
During the last four decades, political polarization in beliefs about whether
differences in economic outcomes between blacks and whites are “mainly due to
discrimination” has strongly increased (Smith et al., 2014). This shift in beliefs is
part of a broader trend in which American politics has become more polarized along
partisan lines than at any point in recent history.2 This experiment sheds light on
the role of political identity (Bursztyn et al., 2019) and the importance of party cues
(Brader and Tucker, 2012) in shaping policy views by providing information about
how the Republican and Democratic parties differ in their support for affirmative
action policies.
Experimental sample and design We recruited 4000 respondents in collaboration
with Research Now, the same market research company as used in Experiment 2.
The sample was constructed to be representative of the US population in terms
of age, sex, and region. We ran the experiment in July 2018, and we submitted a
pre-analysis plan to the same AEA RCT Registry trial as the main experiments
before we started the data collection.3
We randomly assigned respondents into a control group and a treatment group.
For respondents in the treatment group, we added the following introductory
sentence to the question on whether they support affirmative action in hiring:
“In contrast to the Democratic Party, the Republican Party generally opposes all
forms of special treatment based on race.” In the main specification, we focused on
the 2,737 respondents who self-identify as either Democrats or Republicans. We
2 http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-
the-american-public, accessed September 28, 2020.
3 Instructions are provided in Section F.4 of the Online Appendix.
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hypothesized in the pre-analysis plan that this treatment would polarize attitudes by
making Democrats more supportive of pro-black policies while making Republicans
less supportive.
Results The treatment has essentially no impact on attitudes for either Democrats
or Republicans (Table A.20). Given our large sample size and the importance of
political identity and party cues documented in previous research (Brader and
Tucker, 2012; Cappelen et al., 2017), this finding again underscores the point that
views on pro-black policies are hard to move with information.
Table A.20: Experiment 6: Treatment effects of information about party views
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.04 0.03 -0.04 -0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Republicans -0.61*** -0.61*** -0.20*** -0.17***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Treatment × Republicans -0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.03
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Democrats 0.41*** 0.44***
(0.05) (0.05)
Treatment × Democrats 0.08 0.06
(0.07) (0.07)
N 2737 2737 4000 4000
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: The table shows OLS regressions from Experiment 6 (Research Now). The dependent
variable is support for “government and private programs that give qualified black and other
racial minority candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a
job.” Answers were given on a scale from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support). We
have z-scored the responses by the mean and standard deviation in the control group. In
the treatment group, we informed respondents about party views on affirmative action as
follows: “In contrast to the Democratic Party, the Republican Party generally opposes all
forms of special treatment based on race.” In even-numbered columns, we include the fol-
lowing pre-specified controls: gender, age, and education. In line with the pre-analysis, we
exclude Independents from the regression in columns 1–2 as the treatment was tailored to
affect attitudes for Republicans and Democrats. In columns 3–4, we add interaction terms
between the treatment and Democrats and add Independents to the regressions. The sample
was recruited from Research Now and is representative of the US population on the following
observable characteristics: age, sex, and region.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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E. Beliefs about the consequences of callback differences
One potential reason for why respondents do not change their views on pro-black
policies in response to the research evidence could be that they think that lower
callback rates do not hurt blacks in the labor market. For instance, if discrimination
is due to prejudiced employers, people might think that racial segregation of labor
markets allows blacks to avoid contact with prejudiced employers. Correspondence
studies have therefore been criticized for surveying the average firm rather than
the marginal discriminatory firm (Heckman, 1998). People might also think that
blacks easily can compensate for lower callback rates by sending out more resumes.
Using data from Experiment 4, we shed light on this issue by asking our
respondents whether they think that the lower callback rate for black-sounding
names hurts blacks in the labor market. We find that 91 percent of respondents
respond either that the differences in callback rates strongly hurt (35 percent), hurt
(29 percent) or somewhat hurt (26 percent) blacks in the labor market. Even 83
percent of Republicans think that the differences in callback rates strongly hurt
(16 percent), hurt (31 percent) or somewhat hurt (36 percent) blacks in the labor
market (Figure A.10). Overall, these results demonstrate that it is very unlikely
that respondents do not respond to the information because they think that the
callback differential does not hurt blacks in the labor market.
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F. Instructions
F.1. Experiment 1 (NORC)
F.1.1. Elicitation of beliefs about racial discrimination
Researchers from Harvard University and the University of Chicago conducted
an experiment to study racial discrimination in the labor market. They did
so by sending out fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago
newspapers.
The resumes were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the job
applicant. Half of the resumes had typically white-sounding names like “Carrie”
and “Todd”. The other half of the resumes had typically black-sounding names like
“Tanisha” and “Kareem”. The idea was to make sure that the applicants were seen
as having identical qualifications, but that the employers would use the applicants’
names to infer whether they were white or black.
Resumes with white-sounding names had to be sent out on average 10 times to get
one callback for an interview.
What do you think?
How many times do you think resumes with black-sounding names on average had
to be sent out to get one callback for an interview?
I think resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out
times to get one callback for an interview.
If your answer is the same as what the researchers found, you will be rewarded




The researchers found that resumes with black-sounding names on average had to
be sent out 15 times to get one callback for an interview.
Since resumes with white-sounding names on average only had to be sent out 10
times to get one callback for an interview, this means that employers were 50
percent more likely to give callbacks to applicants with white-sounding names
compared to applicants with black-sounding names.
F.1.3. Self-reported outcomes
In the United States today, do you think that racial discrimination against blacks
in the labor market is a serious problem? [A very serious problem/A problem/A
problem/A small problem/Not a problem at all]
Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified
black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job?
[Strongly support/Support/Neither support nor oppose/Oppose/Strongly oppose]
Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified
black candidates assistance in getting a job? [Strongly support/Support/Neither
support nor oppose/Oppose/Strongly oppose]
Name-blind recruitment has been suggested as a way to reduce racial discrimi-
nation in the labor market by hiding the names of the job applicants from their
resumes. Do you support or oppose mandatory name-blind recruitment for hir-
ing in public and private jobs? [Strongly support/Support/Neither support nor
oppose/Oppose/Strongly oppose]
F.1.4. Behavioral measure: Donation
In Washington, D.C., several civil rights organizations work to protect individuals
from discrimination in society. One of these organizations, the Lawyers’ Committee
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for Civil Rights, tries to help African Americans. One of the organization’s key
initiatives aims to reduce racial discrimination in the workplace by lobbying for
political reforms.
Below, you are given the opportunity to financially support the Lawyers’ Committee
for Civil Rights.
Your decision
For each of the 6 choices below, you decide whether the Lawyers’ Committee for
Civil Rights should get money or whether you should get money ($1 equals 1000
AmeriPoints).
We will randomly implement your decision for one of these choices, which involve
real money, so please consider each choice carefully. Each decision has the same
chance of being implemented.
$5 for the organization ©
$5 for the organization ©
$5 for the organization ©
$5 for the organization ©
$5 for the organization ©
$5 for the organization ©
© $0 for me
© $1 for me
© $2 for me
© $3 for me
© $4 for me
© $5 for me
Note: NORC is a non-partisan research organization and has no association with
the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights. NORC and the AmeriSpeak Panel do
not endorse political or charitable causes.
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F.1.5. Belief extrapolation: Discrimination in the housing market
Researchers from Harvard Business School conducted an experiment to study
racial discrimination in the rental market by sending out reservation requests from
invented accounts to hosts on Airbnb, a website for private rental accommodations.
The requests were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the person
who sent the request. Half of the requests came from typically white-sounding
names, while the other half came from typically black-sounding names. The idea
was that the hosts would use the applicants’ name to infer whether the reservation
requests came from white or black requesters.
The researchers found that reservation requests from white-sounding names were
accepted 49 percent of the time.
What do you think?
How many percent of the time do you think reservation requests from black-sounding
names were accepted?
I think reservation requests from black-sounding names were accepted
percent of the time.
If your answer is within 2 percentage points of what the researchers found, you
will be rewarded a bonus of $2 (2,000 AmeriPoints) in addition to your current
incentive of 2,000 AmeriPoints.
F.1.6. Beliefs about strength of the evidence: Treatment group only
The researchers behind the study on labor market discrimination described earlier
in this survey interpreted their findings as clear evidence of discrimination against
blacks in the labor market.
To what extent do you agree or disagree with this interpretation of their findings?
[Strongly agree/Agree/Neither agree nor disagree/Disagree/Strongly disagree]
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F.2. Instructions: Experiment 2 – first wave (Research Now)
F.2.1. Consent Form
This study has received ethics clearance by the Oxford University Insti-
tutional Review Board.
If subjects have questions about this study or their rights, or if they wish





I have read the information provided on the previous page.
I understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time.
I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the study.
I understand how to raise a concern or make a complaint.
I understand that I can only participate in this experiment once.
I understand that close attention to the survey is required for my
responses to count.
If you are 18 years of age or older, agree with the statements above, and freely





F.2.2. Elicitation of beliefs about racial discrimination
Researchers from Harvard University and the University of Chicago conducted
an experiment to study racial discrimination in the labor market. They did
so by sending out fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago
newspapers.
The resumes were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the job
applicant. Half of the resumes had typically white-sounding names like “Carrie”
and “Todd”. The other half of the resumes had typically black-sounding names like
“Tanisha” and “Kareem”.
The idea was to make sure that the applicants were seen as having identical
qualifications, but that the employers would use the applicants’ names to infer
whether they were white or black.
Resumes with white-sounding names had to be sent out on average 10 times to
get one callback for an interview.
What do you think?
How many times do you think resumes with black-sounding names on average
had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview?
I think resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out
times to get one callback for an interview.
If your answer is the same as what the researchers found, you will be rewarded a
bonus of $2 in panel currency.
F.2.3. Confidence in priors








The researchers found that resumes with black-sounding names on average had to
be sent out 15 times to get one callback for an interview.
Since resumes with white-sounding names on average only had to be sent out 10
times to get one callback for an interview, this means that employers were 50
percent more likely to give callbacks to applicants with white-sounding names
than applicants with black-sounding names.
F.2.5. Perceptions of discrimination
In the United States today, do you think that racial discrimination against blacks
in the labor market is a serious problem? [A very serious problem/A problem/A
problem/A small problem/Not a problem at all]
F.3. Instructions: Experiment 2 – second wave (Research Now)
F.3.1. Introduction
This survey is conducted by a researcher from NHH Norwegian School of Economics.
In this survey, you will be asked questions on a broad range of different topics.
Please pay close attention to all questions.
By continuing this survey, you acknowledge your consent to participate and that
you are at least 18 years of age.
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F.3.2. Obfuscation: Views on investments
Which of the following do you think is the best long-term investment: bonds, real
estate, saving accounts, stock or mutual funds, or gold? [Bonds, Real estate, Saving
accounts, Stock or mutual funds, Gold]
{page break}
Do you, personally, or jointly with a spouse, have any money invested in the stock
market right now – either in an individual stock, a stock mutual fund, or in a
self-directed 401-K or IRA? [Yes, No, Do not know]
F.3.3. Obfuscation: Views on religion
How important would you say religion is in your own life – very important, fairly
important, or not very important? [Very imporant, Fairly imporant, Not very
imporant]
{page break}
At the present time, do you think religion as a whole is increasing its influence on
American life or losing its influence? [Increasing/Decreasing/No opinion]
F.3.4. Self-reported outcomes
Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified
black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job?
[Strongly support/Support/Neither support nor oppose/Oppose/Strongly oppose]
{page break}
Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified
black candidates assistance in getting a job? [Strongly support/Support/Neither
support nor oppose/Oppose/Strongly oppose]
{page break}
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Name-blind recruitment has been suggested as a way to reduce racial discrimi-
nation in the labor market by hiding the names of the job applicants from their
resumes. Do you support or oppose mandatory name-blind recruitment for hir-
ing in public and private jobs? [Strongly support/Support/Neither support nor
oppose/Oppose/Strongly oppose]
F.3.5. Mechanisms
Overall, do you think affirmative action programs for the past fifty years have
helped blacks, hurt them, or had no effect one way or the other? [Strongly
helped/Helped/Somewhat helped/Neither helped nor hurt/Somewhat hurt/Hurt/Strongly
hurt]
To what extent do you agree with the following statement: “Differences in economic
outcomes between whites and blacks are primarily the result of racial discrimina-
tion against blacks.” [Strongly agree/Agree/Somewhat agree/Neither agree nor
disagree/Somewhat disagree/Disagree/Strongly disagree]
To what extent do you agree with the following statement: “Differences in economic
outcomes between whites and blacks are primarily the result of whites working
harder than blacks.” [Strongly agree/Agree/Somewhat agree/Neither agree nor
disagree/Somewhat disagree/Disagree/Strongly disagree]
{page break}
In the United States today, do you think that racial discrimination against blacks
in the labor market is a serious problem? [A very serious problem/A problem/A
problem/A small problem/Not a problem at all]
F.3.6. Elicitation of posterior about labor market discrimination
Researchers from Harvard University and the University of Chicago conducted
an experiment to study racial discrimination in the labor market. They did
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so by sending out fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago
newspapers.
The resumes were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the job
applicant. Half of the resumes had typically white-sounding names like “Carrie”
and “Todd”. The other half of the resumes had typically black-sounding names like
“Tanisha” and “Kareem”.
The idea was to make sure that the applicants were seen as having identical
qualifications, but that the employers would use the applicants’ names to infer
whether they were white or black.
Resumes with white-sounding names had to be sent out on average 10 times to
get one callback for an interview.
What do you think?
How many times do you think resumes with black-sounding names on average
had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview?
I think resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out
times to get one callback for an interview.
If your answer is the same as what the researchers found, you will be rewarded a
bonus of $2 in panel currency.
F.3.7. Confidence in posteriors
How sure are you about your answer to the previous question? [Very sure/Sure/Somewhat
sure/Unsure/Very unsure]
F.3.8. Willingness to pay for the information (control group only)
We just explained to you the details of a study which tested for racial discrimination
in the labor market.
For each of the seven choices below, you decide whether you would like to receive
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more information about the results from the study or whether you would like to
receive money.
If you decide to receive the information about the results of the study, we will
provide you with a short summary of the results, including information on the
number of times resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out in order
to get one callback. If you decide to receive the information about the results of
the study, we will also provide you with a link to the research study which further
describes the methodology, implementation of the experiment, and discusses the
research results.
We will randomly implement your decision for one of these choices after the study
has ended, so please consider each choice carefully. Each decision has the same








© $0.10 for me
© $0.20 for me
© $0.30 for me
© $0.40 for me
© $0.50 for me
© $0.75 for me
© $1 for me
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F.3.9. Information provision (depending on people’s choices)
The researchers found that resumes with black-sounding names on average had to
be sent out 15 times to get one callback for an interview.
Since resumes with white-sounding names on average only had to be sent out 10
times to get one callback for an interview, this means that employers were 50
percent more likely to give callbacks to applicants with white-sounding names
compared to applicants with black-sounding names.
http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ321/orazem/bertrand_emily.pdf
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F.4. Experiment 3 (Lucid)
F.4.1. Elicitation: Anchor black
Researchers from Harvard University and the University of Chicago conducted an
experiment to study racial discrimination in the labor market. They did so by
sending out over 4800 fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago
newspapers.
The resumes were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the job
applicant. Half of the resumes had typically white-sounding names like “Carrie”
and “Todd”. The other half of the resumes had typically black-sounding names like
“Tanisha” and “Kareem”.
The idea was to make sure that the applicants were seen as having identical
qualifications, but that the employers would use the applicants’ names to infer
whether they were white or black.
Resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out on average 15 times to
get one callback for an interview.
What do you think?
How many times do you think resumes with white-sounding names on average
had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview?
I think that a resume with a white-sounding name on average had to be sent
out times to get a callback for an interview.
F.4.2. Elicitation: Anchor white
Researchers from Harvard University and the University of Chicago conducted an
experiment to study racial discrimination in the labor market. They did so by
sending out over 4800 fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago
newspapers.
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The resumes were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the job
applicant. Half of the resumes had typically white-sounding names like “Carrie”
and “Todd”. The other half of the resumes had typically black-sounding names like
“Tanisha” and “Kareem”.
The idea was to make sure that the applicants were seen as having identical
qualifications, but that the employers would use the applicants’ names to infer
whether they were white or black.
Resumes with white-sounding names had to be sent out on average 10 times to
get one callback for an interview.
What do you think?
How many times do you think resumes with black-sounding names on average
had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview?
I think that a resume with a black-sounding name on average had to be sent
out times to get a callback for an interview.
F.4.3. Elicitation: Percentage difference
Researchers from Harvard University and the University of Chicago conducted an
experiment to study racial discrimination in the labor market. They did so by
sending out over 4800 fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago
newspapers.
The resumes were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the job
applicant. Half of the resumes had typically white-sounding names like “Carrie”
and “Todd”. The other half of the resumes had typically black-sounding names like
“Tanisha” and “Kareem”.
The idea was to make sure that the applicants were seen as having identical
qualifications, but that the employers would use the applicants’ names to infer
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whether they were white or black.
What do you think that the study found?
I think that white-sounding names received more callbacks for interviews
than black-sounding names.
I think that black-sounding names received more callbacks for interviews than
white-sounding names.
F.4.4. Percentage differences: Screen for respondents who thought
white-sounding names were more likely to get a callback
You said that you think that white-sounding names received more callbacks for
interviews than black-sounding names. How many percent more callbacks for
interviews do you think white-sounding names received?
I think white-sounding names received percent more callbacks.
F.4.5. Percentage differences: Screen for respondents who thought
black-sounding names were more likely to get a callback
You said that you think that black-sounding names received more callbacks for
interviews than white-sounding names. How many percent more callbacks for
interviews do you think black-sounding names received?
I think black-sounding names received percent more callbacks.
F.4.6. Information treatment
For your information, the study found that white-sounding names received 50
percent more callbacks for interviews than black-sounding names.
F.4.7. Views on pro-black policies
Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified
black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job?
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[Strongly support/Support/Neither support nor oppose/Oppose/Strongly oppose]
Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified
black candidates assistance in getting a job? [Strongly support/Support/Neither
support nor oppose/Oppose/Strongly oppose]
Name-blind recruitment has been suggested as a way to reduce racial discrimination
in the labor market by hiding the names of the job applicants from their resumes.
Do you support or oppose mandatory name-blind recruitment for hiring in public and
private jobs? [Strongly support/Support/Neither support nor oppose/Oppose/Strongly
oppose]
F.4.8. Beliefs about correspondence studies
To what extent do you agree with the following statement: “Sending out fictitious
resumes to assess whether white-sounding names or black-sounding names receive
more callbacks for interviews is a reliable method to detect racial discrimination
in hiring.” [Strongly agree/Agree/Neither agree nor disagree/Disagree/Strongly
disagree]
F.4.9. Post-treatment beliefs about discrimination
What would you say is the likelihood that...
(Please note: The numbers need to add up to 100%)
there is discrimination against blacks in hiring. %
there is discrimination against whites in hiring. %
there is no racial discrimination in hiring. %
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F.5. Instructions: Experiment 4: Interpretation of correspondence
studies
F.5.1. Beliefs about sources of discrimination
Researchers from Harvard University and the University of Chicago conducted an
experiment to study racial discrimination in the labor market. They did so by
sending out over 4800 fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago
newspapers.
The resumes were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the job
applicant. Half of the resumes had typically white-sounding names like “Carrie”
and “Todd”. The other half of the resumes had typically black-sounding names like
“Tanisha” and “Kareem”.
The idea was to make sure that the applicants were seen as having identical
qualifications, but that the employers would use the applicants’ names to infer
whether they were white or black.
The researchers found that white-sounding names received 50 percent more callbacks
for interviews than black-sounding names.
What do you think is the main reason that employers are more likely to call back
applicants with white-sounding names?
They don’t want to hire black candidates because they don’t like to interact
with blacks
They think the resume credentials are more informative about the skills of
white job applicants than about the skills of black job applicants
They correctly think that blacks on average tend to be less productive than
whites
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They incorrectly think that blacks on average tend to be less productive than
whites
They subconsciously rely on negative stereotypes about blacks
I don’t think it’s generally true that employers are more likely to call back
applicants with white-sounding names
F.5.2. Beliefs about whether correspondence studies is a good method
To what extent do you agree with the following statement: “Sending out fictitious
resumes to assess whether white-sounding names or black-sounding names receive
more callbacks for interviews is a reliable method to detect racial discrimination
in hiring.” [Strongly agree/Agree/Neither agree nor disagree/Disagree/Strongly
disagree]
F.5.3. Beliefs about whether discrimination hurts blacks
Employers are on average 50 percent more likely to call back applications with
white-sounding names than applicants with black-sounding names. Do you think
the lower callback rate for black-sounding names hurts blacks in the labor market?
[Strongly hurts/Hurts/Somewhat hurts/Does not hurt/Does not hurt at all]
F.5.4. Policy preferences
Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified
black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job?
[Strongly support/Support/Neither support nor oppose/Oppose/Strongly oppose]
F.6. Instructions: Experiment 5: Racial stereotypes
F.6.1. Pre-treatment beliefs
In this survey, we will ask you some questions about whites and blacks in America.
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Throughout this survey, we will refer to non-Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic
blacks as whites and blacks, respectively.
{page break}
The General Social Survey (GSS) is a large and representative survey of Americans.
In the survey, people were asked to rank the importance of the following five job
characteristics (from least important to most important):
• High income
• No danger of being fired
• Working hours are short, lots of free time
• Chances for advancement
• Work that is important and gives a feeling of accomplishment
Among whites, which response do you think was most commonly chosen as the
least important characteristic of a job?
High income
No danger of being fired
Working hours are short, lots of free time
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Chances for advancement
Work that is important and gives a feeling of accomplishment
Among blacks, which response do you think was most commonly chosen as the
least important characteristic of a job?
High income
No danger of being fired
Working hours are short, lots of free time
Chances for advancement
Work that is important and gives a feeling of accomplishment
F.6.2. Information treatment
The actual results on which response people most commonly chose as least impor-
tant characteristic of a job were as follows:
Among whites, the response “Working hours are short, lots of free time” was most
commonly chosen as the least important characteristic of a job.
Among blacks, the response “Working hours are short, lots of free time” was most
commonly chosen as the least important characteristic of a job.
Source: The General Social Survey
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F.6.3. Views on pro-black policies
We will now ask you a few questions about your attitudes towards policies to help
blacks in the labor market.
{page break}
Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified
black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job?
[Strongly support/Support/Neither support nor oppose/Oppose/Strongly oppose]
{page break, note: We randomize the order of these two questions}
Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified
black candidates assistance in getting a job? [Strongly support/Support/Neither
support nor oppose/Oppose/Strongly oppose]
F.6.4. Post-treatment beliefs
To what extent do you agree with the following statement:
“Differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks are primarily the
result of whites working harder than blacks.” [Strongly agree/Agree/Somewhat
agree/Neither agree nor disagree/Somewhat disagree/Disagree/Strongly disagree]
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F.7. Instructions: Experiment 6: Political identity and party cues
F.7.1. Treatment group
A much debated issue is whether blacks and other racial minorities should get
preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job. In contrast to
the Democratic Party, the Republican Party generally opposes all forms of special
treatment based on race. We are interested in what you think about this issue.
Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified
black and other racial minority candidates preference over equally qualified white
candidates in getting a job? [Strongly support/Support/Neither support nor
oppose/Oppose/Strongly oppose]
F.7.2. Control group group
A much debated issue is whether blacks and other racial minorities should get
preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job. We are interested
in what you think about this issue.
Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified
black and other racial minority candidates preference over equally qualified white
candidates in getting a job?
F.7.3. Outcome measure
Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified
black and other racial minority candidates preference over equally qualified white
candidates in getting a job? [Strongly support/Support/Neither support nor
oppose/Oppose/Strongly oppose]
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